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THE PENUMBRAL PUBLIC DOMAIN: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
ON QUASI-COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION
Aaron K. Perzanowski

*

INTRODUCTION
Congress’s authority to establish copyright laws, like every grant of
legislative authority, contains limits on the scope of federal power.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 provides Congress with the authority to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re1
spective Writings and Discoveries.” In broad terms, the limits inherent in Clause 8 divide into two categories: limits on the sorts of works
in which Congress can grant exclusive rights and limits on the types
of exclusive rights that Congress can use to protect those works. The
outer edges of this power, at least as much as any other legislative
grant, were “defined, and limited . . . [so] that those limits may not be
2
mistaken, or forgotten.”

*

1

2

© 2008 Aaron K. Perzanowski. The author hereby permits the use of this Article under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States license, the full terms of
which are available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/legalcode.
Microsoft Research Fellow, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, UC Berkeley School
of Law. Thanks to Brian W. Carver, Deirdre Mulligan, Amy Rodriguez, Pam Samuelson,
and Fred von Lohmann for their comments on earlier drafts.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Scholars have referred to this clause by a number of names:
the “Intellectual Property Clause,” Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property
Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1771, 1771 (2006); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 1 (1994); the “Patent and Copyright Clause,” Robert P.
Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 2187, 2208 (2000); Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by § 103
of the 1952 Patent Act, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 147, 150 (2004); the “Progress Clause,” Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed To Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 754
(2001); and the “Exclusive Rights Clause,” Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice
and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 173,
175 (2003). Rather than adopt any of these terms, many of which suggest some ideological bias, this Article refers to “Clause 8.”
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803); see 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 486
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But Congress has other powers—chief among them, its authority
to regulate interstate commerce—that could allow it to undermine
the limits of Clause 8. The breadth of the modern Commerce
3
Clause provides Congress with authority over subject matter once
squarely and exclusively within the domain of Clause 8. Unrestrained, this independent commerce power could permit Congress
to ignore the limits on its copyright authority.
This Article aims to achieve two objectives. First, recognizing that
courts have not yet done so, it outlines a general approach to identifying and resolving inter-clause conflicts. Second, it applies that general framework to the copyright power of Clause 8 in order to define
the scope of constitutional prohibitions against quasi-copyright pro4
tections.
This Article argues that the limits of Clause 8 apply any time Congress attempts to legislate within the core subject matter of its copyright power—grants of exclusive rights in expression. Unless the limits of Clause 8 cabin the commerce power, those limits are effectively
stricken from the Constitution, despite the Framers’ best efforts to
ensure that they could not be ignored.
Once the limits of Clause 8 are understood to apply regardless of
5
the power Congress recites, a public domain or component thereof
6
firmly and permanently rooted in the Constitution emerges. This

3
4
5

6

(1953) (“Reading the [Clause 8] power, then, in light of the statute of Anne and the then
recent decisions of the English courts, it is clear that this power of Congress was enumerated in the Constitution, for the purpose of expressing its limitations.”).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The scope of this Article is limited to the copyright power of Clause 8, but the general
principles and some of the limits addressed are equally applicable to the patent power.
The term “public domain” is used to refer to a number of distinct but overlapping concepts. See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 68 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching
Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006). To the extent a single public domain exists, it comprises some or all of these interrelated components.
This Article is not the first to suggest that limits inherent in the Constitution give rise to a
mandatory public domain. See Benkler, supra note 1 at 201; Robert Patrick Merges &
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Essay, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 45, 52–53 (2000); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right To Have Something To Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 313–15 (2004). Nor
is it the first to argue that specific classes of works are beyond the constitutional scope of
Clause 8 authority. See generally, Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539–49 (2000); Michael Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the
Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF INFORMATION (P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie
Guibault eds., 2005); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative
Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1119 (2000); William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An
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public domain, defined by the limits of Clause 8, includes unoriginal
and unwritten expressive works. These two classes of works, as a constitutional matter, cannot be the subject of federal grants of exclusive
rights.
Part I examines the source of inter-clause conflicts and suggests
that they are primarily a result of the expansion of Congress’s commerce authority. Prior to this expansion, Congress’s enumerated
powers each occupied distinct zones of authority that were infrequently invaded by other clauses. The limits of one clause rarely conflicted with the power granted under another. Since inter-clause conflicts were unanticipated, the Framers neglected to specify whether
the limits in one clause could restrain another. The Court has struggled with this ambiguity on the few occasions it has considered interclause conflict, and no generally applicable approach has emerged
from the Court’s efforts.
Part II outlines such an approach. Its starting point is the canon
of construction that rejects readings of documents that render text
superfluous. If the limits of Clause 8 and Congress’s other enumerated powers cannot restrict legislation otherwise justified under the
commerce power, those limits will be all but erased from the Constitution. In order to avoid undue restraints on congressional authority,
this approach requires the sepraration of genuine external limits
from mere descriptions of the scope of a particular power. This separation, in turn, relies on a comparative analysis that considers each
enumerated power in the broader context of Congress’s legislative
authority as a whole.
After identifying the potential limits on Congress’s copyright authority, Part III applies this general approach to Clause 8. This Part
isolates the core subject matter of Congress’s copyright authority—
the power to grant exclusive rights in expression. Because no other
enumerated powers permit Congress to grant such rights, the limits
of Clause 8 restrain Congress any time it seeks to confer exclusive
rights in expressive works regardless of the power under which it attempts to act. Applied externally, the limits of Clause 8 define both a
set of exclusive rights and a set of expressive works beyond the reach
of Congress—the penumbral public domain.

Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1999); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of
the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
259 (1995).
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Part IV examines existing and proposed legislation that invades
the penumbral public domain by granting exclusive rights that ignore
the limits on Congress’s positive authority. In particular, this Part
addresses the federal anti-bootlegging statutes, which protect live musical performances from unauthorized recordings ostensibly under
the Commerce Clause. Despite the Second Circuit’s recent decision
in United States v. Martignon upholding the constitutionality of the sta7
tutes, they fall within the ambit of Clause 8 and must adhere to its
limits.
I. THE PROBLEM OF INTER-CLAUSE CONFLICT
In 1994, when Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements
8
Act (“URAA”), it faced a dilemma. The URAA implemented the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
9
(“TRIPS”). TRIPS, in part, called for copyright-like protections for
10
unfixed live performances for a term of at least fifty years. The
11
United States—the chief architect and proponent of TRIPS —
encountered a significant hurdle in implementing these protections,
namely that Congress’s copyright authority under Clause 8 permits
exclusive rights only in “Writings.” Since unfixed live performances
12
do not qualify as “Writings,” the protections required by TRIPS and
embodied in the URAA were impermissible under Congress’s Clause
8 power.
Despite the limits inherent in Clause 8, Congress enacted the
URAA, creating two statutes, § 1101 of Title 17 and § 2319A of Title
18 of the United States Code, that impose civil and criminal penalties
for copyright infringement on those who record, reproduce, and dis13
tribute unauthorized recordings of live musical performances. Not
7
8
9

10
11
12
13

492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
See id. § 101(d)(15), § 315. TRIPS was a component of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (“GATT”). See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, 87.
Id. at 83.
United States Submits TRIPS Proposal to GATT, 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No.
981, at 72–73 (May 17, 1990).
See infra Part III.A.4.
17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000) (“Unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and
music videos”); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000) (“Unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in
sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances”). One may ask why
protection above and beyond that already provided by the Copyright Act is necessary for
live performances. The composer of the work performed, to the extent the composition
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only do the statutes extend copyright-like protections to non-writings,
but those protections are perpetual, in direct conflict with the limited
14
times requirement of Clause 8.
When these anti-bootlegging statutes were inevitably challenged as
improper exercises of Congress’s Clause 8 authority, the United
States defended them on the grounds that the statutes reflected the
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. According to the
United States, as regulations of interstate commerce, the statutes
were immune from the limitations that restrict traditional copyright
laws.
15
In the first of these cases, United States v. Moghadam, the Eleventh
Circuit considered an appeal to a conviction under § 2319A. In analyzing the constitutionality of the statute, the court assumed arguendo
that § 2319A violated the limits of Clause 8 by protecting unwritten
16
live performances. However, the court recognized that the Commerce Clause offered an alternative source of legislative power since
17
unauthorized recordings substantially affect interstate commerce.
Because § 2319A was impermissible under Clause 8, but seemingly
within the scope of Congress’s commerce authority, the constitutionality of the statute turned on the resolution of this inter-clause conflict. In short, could Congress avoid the limits of Clause 8 by acting
under the commerce power?
According to the court, statutes justified as regulations of commerce are bound by the limits of Clause 8 only to the extent the stat-

14

15
16
17

was fixed prior to performance, possesses a copyright that can be asserted against an unauthorized recordist. However, bootleg producers could utilize the mechanical license
provided by § 115 of the Copyright Act to satisfy the composer’s interest. 17 U.S.C. § 115
(2000). But the performer, who may own no interest in the composition, possesses no interest in the performance itself under traditional copyright law. Even if the performer
records her performance in real time, an unauthorized recordist arguably does not infringe the subsequent copyright that the performer enjoys in her own recording. The
performer’s recording was not fixed at the time of the unauthorized recording, and the
two were independently created. Therefore, at the time the URAA was adopted, a performer had no assertable interest in her performance qua performance under federal
law.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000) (providing civil remedies for the unauthorized use, communication, or distribution of sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances without establishing any time limit for protection); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)
(2000) (providing criminal penalties for the unauthorized use, communication, or distribution of sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances without establishing any time limit for protection).
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1276.
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18

utes are “fundamentally inconsistent with” those limits.
Section 2319A, according to the court, was “in no way inconsistent with
the Copyright Clause . . . . Quite the contrary, extending such protection actually complements and is in harmony with the existing
19
scheme that Congress has set up under the Copyright Clause.” In
the court’s view, since granting exclusive rights in non-writings does
not fundamentally conflict with the objectives of Clause 8, § 2319A
20
was a valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority. However, the
court intimated on three occasions that, had the issue of the perpetual duration of the statute been properly raised, it would have held
that the limited times requirement imposed an enforceable limit on
21
the Commerce Clause.
Moghadam’s fundamental inconsistency test is problematic. It
suggests that certain limits on Congress’s constitutional authority, like
the writings requirement of Clause 8, can be ignored if Congress so
decides. Other limits, like the limited times requirement, cannot be
disregarded because their violation would result in a fundamental inconsistency with the purposes of other enumerated powers. But Moghadam offers little justification for this distinction; nor does it articulate any method by which future courts can separate genuine limits
from disposable ones.
Not surprisingly, the next court to address § 2319A declined to
adopt Moghadam’s reasoning. In United States v. Martignon, the proprietor of a retail record shop was charged with “selling unauthorized
22
recordings of live performances by certain musical artists.” Martignon, having learned from Moghadam’s mistake, argued that the

18
19
20

21

22

Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1282. Moghadam suffered from an incomplete understanding of the purpose of
Clause 8. The court assumed that any expansion of Congress’s ability to grant exclusive
rights in expression is consistent with the objective of Clause 8. See id. at 1280–82. This
position assumes that the protection of creative works is the ultimate aim of Clause 8 and
not merely an instrumental goal. The Framers sought to create a system of incentives for
the creation, distribution, and eventual use of expressive works—a goal that relied not
only on grants of rights, but also on the careful circumscribing of the bounds of that protection. See infra Part III. The court’s inability to recognize the constitutional role of the
limits of Clause 8 led it to conclude that violations of the writings requirement could be
reconciled with the Framers’ objectives. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 n.9, 1281 n.15, 1282 n.17. The court refused to consider
Moghadam’s limited times argument because it was raised for the first time in his reply
brief. Id. at 1281 n.15.
346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).
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statute violated both the writings and limited times requirements of
23
Clause 8.
The Martignon district court analyzed the constitutionality of the
statute not by asking whether it was fundamentally inconsistent with
the objectives of Clause 8, but by asking whether, at its core, § 2319A
24
was “a copyright law or a commercial regulation.” The court considered a number of factors, some of which—the actual and intended
effects of the statute, for example—offered valuable insight into the
statute’s nature; other factors, like the fact that § 2319A was codified
in close proximity to the criminal copyright infringement statute,
provided less convincing reasons to treat § 2319A as a copyright law
25
for constitutional purposes. Ultimately, the court concluded that
even if § 2319A was not a copyright law, it was so “copyright-like” that
26
it must be bound by the limits of Clause 8. Because it violated those
27
limits, the statute was held unconstitutional.
But the court’s failure to draw any explicit distinction between
copyright laws and their copyright-like counterparts, and the absence
of any transparent basis for classifying § 2319A as the latter, render its
reasoning little more satisfying than Moghadam’s fundamental inconsistency test. Indeed, as discussed infra, the Second Circuit overturned the district court’s holding in Martignon and adopted yet another ultimately flawed analysis of the inter-clause conflict created by
28
the anti-bootlegging statutes.
Beyond illustrating the specific tension between Congress’s commerce authority and limits inherent in Clause 8, Moghadam and Martignon encapsulate the broader question at the heart of all interclause conflict: When Congress faces a barrier to legislative action,
may it act under an alternative source of authority to achieve an aim
foreclosed by another enumerated power?
23
24
25
26
27

28

Id. at 416–17.
Id. at 419.
See id. at 420–422.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 428. The treatment of the civil anti-bootlegging statute under § 1101 further underscores the confusion facing courts over inter-clause conflict. In KISS Catalog I, the district court explicitly adopted Martignon’s rationale and held § 1101 unconstitutional. See
KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (KISS Catalog I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal.
2004). However, after the death of the original presiding judge and the intervention of
the United States, the court, on a motion for reconsideration, vacated the prior order.
See KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods.(KISS Catalog II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D.
Cal. 2005). Kiss Catalog II likewise rejected Moghadam’s fundamental inconsistency test,
maintaining that the Commerce Clause and Clause 8 were entirely independent sources
of authority. Id. at 1173–76.
See infra Part IV.D.
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Likewise, these two cases demonstrate that courts faced with interclause conflict often struggle to make sense of the relationships between grants of legislative authority. This confusion results, in part,
from the inherent ambiguity of the text of Article I, Section 8. The
limits contained within each enumerated power do not require, on
their face, that Congress yield to those limits when acting pursuant to
other legislative powers. This Part begins by exploring the ambiguity
of limits on Congress’s legislative authority and the Supreme Court’s
failure to offer the guidance necessary to resolve it. This Part concludes by examining the primary source of inter-clause conflict, the
expansion of the Commerce Clause.
A. Internal and External Application of Constitutional Limits
Two propositions illustrate the inherent difficulty in resolving
conflicts between constitutional grants of legislative authority. First,
because the legislative powers enumerated in the Constitution are
cumulative, “what cannot be done under one of them may very well
29
be doable under another.” Second, and equally true, Congress may
not circumvent the limits imposed by one provision of the Constitu30
tion simply by acting under another grant of authority. These two
propositions, although seemingly at odds, are in fact complimentary.
In isolation, neither fully accounts for the complex interactions between the provisions of Article I, Section 8, but taken together, they
explain that Congress is free to legislate under any sufficient constitutional grant, so long as it does not contravene applicable limitations
elsewhere in the Constitution.
But determining whether a limit constrains other grants of authority is not always an easy task. Some limiting language functions
purely descriptively. Since Congress’s legislative powers are cumulative, these internal limits outline the scope of a particular enumerated power without constraining other grants of authority. Article I,
Section 8, Clause 10, for example, provides Congress authority to “de31
fine and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.”
As a matter of textual interpretation, one would reasonably read the
phrase “committed on the high Seas” as a characterization of the
scope of the power granted under this clause—one that imposes no

29
30
31

United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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constraints on Congress’s ability to punish felonies committed on
land under other grants of authority.
But other limits in the Constitution undoubtedly function proscriptively. These limits not only apply to the provision within which
they are situated, but also externally constrain Congress’s power under other grants of authority. The First Amendment serves as an obvious instance of a constitutional provision that extends to all enu32
merated powers. Congress, for example, could not disregard the
First Amendment by punishing seditious speech uttered on the high
seas, despite its power under Clause 10.
Some external limits are easily identified. The requirement that
“Congress shall make no law” expressly constrains congressional au33
thority regardless of its source. But most limitations in the Constitution are not expressed in such categorical terms. These limits more
closely resemble the language confining congressional authority un34
der Clause 10 to felonies and piracies “on the high Seas.” Nothing
inherent in such text demands external application. The limits of
Clause 8, for example, with the potential exception of its “promote
the Progress” language, appear textually indistinguishable from other
potentially descriptive limits in Article I.
The meaning of the Constitution, of course, is not always selfevident. Traditionally, we rely on the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to provide the interpretative guidance needed to resolve these ambiguities. However, the Court’s limited treatment of
inter-clause conflict raises more questions than it answers.
B. The Supreme Court and Inter-Clause Conflict
The Supreme Court has had few opportunities to consider potential conflicts between the authority conferred by one enumerated
power and the limits imposed by another. The few cases addressing
inter-clause conflicts fail to offer a consistent, generalizable method
for recognizing and resolving them. Nonetheless, the Court has
demonstrated a general receptiveness to the notion that the limits of
one enumerated power may, under appropriate circumstances, restrain Congress from acting under an alternative source of authority.

32
33

34

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id. The prohibitions against titles of nobility, bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws offer some additional examples of express external constraints. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cls. 3, 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons offers the Court’s clearest
35
treatment of inter-clause conflict. There, the Court held that a limit
36
in the Bankruptcy Clause invalidated legislation otherwise permissi37
ble under the Commerce Clause. In 1975, the Chicago, Rock Island
and Pacific Railroad Company (“Rock Island”) sought bankruptcy
38
protection. Four years later, the company ceased operations, and
the reorganization court ordered the liquidation of Rock Island’s as39
sets. In response, Congress enacted the Rock Island Railroad Tran40
sition and Employee Assistance Act (“RITA”) to ensure that former
Rock Island employees received $75 million in benefits from the
41
Rock Island estate.
Gibbons, Rock Island’s trustee, sought to have RITA declared unconstitutional as a non-uniform, and thus invalid, exercise of the
42
Bankruptcy Clause. Appellants, along with the United States, contended that RITA was authorized as an exercise of Commerce Clause
authority, and thus not subject to the uniformity requirement of the
43
Bankruptcy Clause.
Railway Labor presented two questions to the Court: first, whether
RITA was subject to the uniformity requirement, and second, whether RITA satisfied that requirement. In determining whether RITA
was “an exercise of Congress’[s] power under the Bankruptcy
Clause . . . or under the Commerce Clause,” the Court noted the dif44
ficulty of distinguishing between bankruptcy and commerce. Since
RITA directly addressed the subject matter of bankruptcy law by “prescrib[ing] the manner in which the property of the Rock Island estate

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

44

455 U.S. 457 (1982).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. (providing Congress with the power to “establish . . . uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”).
Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 473.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.
Pub. L. No. 96-254, 94 Stat. 399 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.).
Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 462.
Id. at 463.
Id.; see also Brief for Appellant at 20, 32–36, Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. 457 (Nos. 80-415, 801239), 1981 WL 390393; Brief for the Federal Appellees at 23, Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. 457
(Nos. 80-415, 80-1239) 1981 WL 390396.
Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 465. In furtherance of this point, the Court quoted James Madison’s observation that “[t]he power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 285
(James Madison) (N.Y. Heritage Press, 1945), and cited Sturges v. Crowninshield in a parenthetical quote: “The bankrupt law is said to grow out of the exigencies of commerce . . . .” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195 (1819). Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 465–66.
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45

[was] to be distributed among its creditors,” the Court held that
RITA functioned as a bankruptcy law and was subject to the uniform46
ity requirement. But because the Act targeted only the creditors
and employees of Rock Island, the Court determined that RITA
served as “nothing more than a private bill,” and thus lacked uni47
formity.
The Commerce Clause presented a seemingly independent and
sufficient justification for RITA’s regulation of an instrumentality of
interstate commerce. But because the subject matter of RITA encroached upon the domain of the Bankruptcy Clause, the uniformity
requirement precluded the Act, despite the apparent sufficiency of
the commerce power.
Railway Labor is the most frequently cited case restraining Congress from acting under one power on the basis of a limit inherent in
48
49
another. But it is arguably not the only one. In Perry v. United
45
46
47
48

Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 467.
See id. at 467–69.
Id. at 471.
One opponent of external application of Clause 8 limitations attempts to explain away
Railway Labor as the product of an unstated parallel drawn by the Court to the express limitations of the Contract Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See Thomas B. Nachbar,
Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 314–16 (2004). Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 precludes states from enacting laws that impair the obligations
of contracts. The Railway Labor Court, under this view, sought to impose a similar restraint on Congress, preventing it from interfering with existing contractual relationships
with the railroad’s preferred creditors. According to this reading, in holding that RITA
could not be enacted under the commerce power, the uniformity requirement of the
Bankruptcy Clause served as a “federal analog of the Contracts Clause” that “mirror[ed]
an explicit (and therefore generally applicable) limitation” on states. Id. at 315–16.
Congress’s inability to enact non-uniform bankruptcy laws under the Commerce Clause,
therefore, is not the result of the external application of Bankruptcy Clause limitations,
but an outgrowth of the express limitations of the Contract Clause.
This reading of Railway Labor dramatically overstates the Court’s reliance on the Contract Clause. The Contract Clause rationale was not addressed in the parties’ briefs and
was entertained in only a single question at oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 455 U.S. 457 (Nos. 80-415 & 80-1239), reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1981 TERM SUPPLEMENT, at 393 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds.,
1983). The Railway Labor opinion refers to the Contract Clause by name only twice. Ry.
Labor 455 U.S. at 472 n.14. In discussing the difficulty of defining the subject matter of
bankruptcy regulation, the Court noted that the Bankruptcy Clause “includes the power
to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities,” something that “the States
were forbidden to do.” Id. at 466 (quoting Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181,
188 (1902)). Second, the Court suggested in a footnote that the desire for uniformity
finds expression in both the text of the Bankruptcy Clause and in the decision to reserve
bankruptcy as an exclusively federal concern. Id. at 472 n.14.
Neither of these references supports the Court’s posited attempt to apply the uniformity requirement as a federal instantiation of the Contract Clause. At most, these iso-
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50

States, the Court considered a potential conflict between Congress’s
51
power to “coin Money, [and] regulate the Value thereof,” and its
52
power to “borrow Money on the credit of the United States.” The
government issued bonds “payable in United States gold coin of the
53
present standard of value.” Subsequently, Congress enacted legislation rendering these “gold clause[s]” void and permitting payment
54
“in any coin or currency,” substantially devaluing the bonds.
According to the Court, “[t]he question [was] whether the Congress can use [the power to regulate the value of money] so as to invalidate the terms of the obligations which the Government has theretofore issued in the exercise of the power to borrow money on the
55
credit of the United States.” Because Congress lacks the authority to
alter or destroy its obligations, the legislation exceeded Congress’s
56
authority to regulate the value of money. An inherent limit of one
57
enumerated power restrained Congress from enacting legislation
otherwise justified by another.
Even where the Court has upheld legislation challenged on the
basis of inter-clause conflict, it has recognized that one enumerated
power may constrain another under appropriate circumstances. The
58
Head Money Cases serve as one example. After Congress enacted legislation imposing a fifty-cent fee on sea vessels for every non-citizen
59
passenger arriving in the United States, ship owners brought suit.
They argued that the Act functioned as a tax, but failed to conform to
60
the uniformity requirement of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 because
61
the fee did not apply to land-based immigration.

49

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

lated statements demonstrate the Court’s recognition that the Contract Clause, in part,
furthered the same policy objective that motivated the Framers to insist upon uniform
federal bankruptcy laws. The leap from this recognition to the claim that the uniformity
requirement is uniquely suited for external application because it serves as a proxy for the
Contract Clause is a long one.
For a detailed discussion of the cases relevant to inter-clause conflict, see Dotan Oliar,
Resolving Conflicts Among Congress’s Powers Regarding Statutes’ Constitutionality: The Case of
Anti-Bootlegging Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2007).
294 U.S. 330 (1935).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
Perry, 294 U.S. at 347.
Id. at 349; see also S.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong., 48 Stat. 112 (1933).
Perry, 294 U.S. at 350.
Id. at 353–54.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
112 U.S. 580 (1884).
Id. at 580–81; see also Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 594–95.
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The Court had little trouble concluding that the Act was within
the positive authority granted by the Commerce Clause, as it directly
62
regulated foreign commerce.
Nonetheless, the Court analyzed
whether the statute conflicted with the uniformity requirement of the
Tax Clause, concluding that because the fee applied to all foreign
63
passengers arriving at all ports, it was sufficiently uniform.
The
Court’s consideration of the question of uniformity suggests that it
understood that the limits of one clause could impinge Congress’s
power under another, and that the scope of Congress’s positive
commerce authority was insufficient to resolve the question of interclause conflict.
64
But at least one case, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
arguably supports the contrary proposition—that Congress may enact
legislation that violates the limits of one grant of authority by acting
under an alternative source of power. In Heart of Atlanta, the Court
upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination
by “any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests” on the basis of “race, color, religion, or na65
tional origin.” The motel argued that the Act was not within Congress’s commerce authority. The Court disagreed, holding that
activities regulated by the Act were sufficiently interstate to fall within
66
the commerce power.
Read in isolation, Heart of Atlanta is a case concerned purely with
the scope of Congress’s positive authority under the Commerce
Clause. The issue of inter-clause conflict arises only when Heart of At67
lanta is read in contrast with the Civil Rights Cases, decided some
eighty years earlier. There, the Court considered the Civil Rights Act
of 1875, which punished those who denied individuals “full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations . . . of inns . . . and other places of
68
public amusement.” The Court, writing decades before the expansion of the commerce power, assumed that the power to enact such
legislation could be found, if anywhere, in the Thirteenth and Four69
teenth Amendments.” But according to the Court, since it penal-

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 595.
Id. at 596.
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(a), (b)(1), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243.
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336..
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10; see also U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XIV.
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ized private conduct rather than state action, the Fourteenth
70
Amendment offered insufficient support.
If the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidated the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, one could argue, the Court’s subsequent approval
of the 1964 Act as an exercise of the commerce power shows that
Congress is free to disregard limits found elsewhere in the Constitution by acting under another enumerated power. At the very least,
Heart of Atlanta reflects an implicit recognition that the limits of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment do not restrain Congress when
it seeks to remedy discrimination through the regulation of interstate
71
commerce. But it would be easy to overstate the importance of
Heart of Atlanta as a window into the Court’s thinking about interclause conflict. Heart of Atlanta, after all, does not explicitly consider,
much less reject, the notion that some limits on legislative authority
72
apply externally under appropriate circumstances.
Railway Labor, Perry, and the Head Money Cases all embrace the notion that limits contained within one enumerated power can constrain legislation otherwise permissible under another grant of authority. The contrast between these cases and Heart of Atlanta’s silent
reluctance to acknowledge and resolve a potential inter-clause conflict reveals in even sharper relief the questions left unanswered by
Railway Labor—namely, which limits apply externally and under what
circumstances. But these unanswered questions cannot be addressed
without first exploring the primary cause of inter-clause conflict: the
breadth of the modern commerce power.
70

71

72

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24–25. The Court likewise rejected the Thirteenth Amendement as a proper source for Congress’s power to pass the Act since the refusal of such
accomodations, in the Court’s view, had “nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude.” Id. at 24.
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court was confident that Congress made no attempt to act
pursuant to its commerce authority. 109 U.S. at 19 (“And whether Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce amongst the several States, might or might not
pass a law regulating rights in public conveyances passing from one State to another, is also a question which is not now before us, as the sections in question are not conceived in
any such view.”). But the Court suggested that had the Act been limited to interstate
commerce, the Constitution would have posed no bar. Id. at 18 (“Of course, these remarks [as to lack of congressional power] do not apply to those cases in which Congress is
clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, . . . as in the
regulation of commerce . . . among the several States . . . . In these cases Congress has
power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct
and transactions of individuals in respect thereof.”).
The Court distinguished the 1875 Act on the grounds that it regulated a broader category
of largely intrastate activity and determined that the Civil Rights Cases were “inapposite,
and without precedential value” in its consideration of the 1964 Act. Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).

June 2008]

PENUMBRAL PUBLIC DOMAIN

1095

C. Commerce Clause Expansion
Although conflicts between alternative sources of congressional
authority occasionally arise in other contexts, inter-clause conflict is
primarily an outgrowth of the expansive reading of the Commerce
Clause that has prevailed for the past seventy years. The original
scope of the commerce power is open to debate, but a growing body
of opinion agrees that it was far narrower than contemporary doc73
trine would suggest. Prior to the expansion of the commerce power, the grants of legislative authority conferred distinct powers upon
the legislature. As a result, Congress and the courts rarely had occasion to question whether a limit in one enumerated power should
constrain action under another. The distinct nature of Congress’s
enumerated powers also explains the Framers’ failure to unambiguously identify external limits. But as the commerce power expanded,
the likelihood of inter-clause conflicts increased; after the Court’s de74
cision in Wickard v. Filburn, they became unavoidable.
The Court’s first opportunity to examine the scope of the commerce power came in 1824 when it decided Gibbons v. Ogden, a dis75
pute between two rival ferry operators. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion held that the commerce power was not limited “to traffic, to
buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities,” but em76
braced navigation as well. The Court recognized that “[c]ommerce
among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each
77
State, but may be introduced into the interior.” But Chief Justice
Marshall excluded the power to regulate commerce that is “completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State,

73

74
75
76

77

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 58 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Clause’s text,
structure, and history all indicate that, at the time of the founding, the term ‘commerce’
consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”)
(internal quotations omitted); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the
Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 857–62 (2003) (concluding that the public shared a
similar understanding of the meaning of “commerce”); Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 112–25 (2001) (concluding, on the
basis of contemporary sources, that “commerce” referred to trade, rather than economic
activity broadly).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 189. This view, as the Court noted, was consistent with the well-accepted understanding of “commerce” at the time of ratification. See id. at 190 (“All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word ‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation.
It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was
framed.”).
Id. at 194.
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or between different parts of the same State, and which does not ex78
tend to or affect other States” from Congress’s commerce authority.
In the century following Gibbons, the Court’s interpretation of the
Commerce Clause evolved in parallel along three distinct fronts. The
Court explored the extent to which intrastate journeys that are components of interstate travel are the proper subject of congressional
79
regulation. It grappled with the relationship between commerce,
narrowly defined, and other productive activities like manufacturing
80
and agriculture. And it considered legislation that used the commerce power to regulate local activities deemed immoral or danger81
ous. Although this period yielded incremental extensions of the
commerce power, the Court retained meaningful and identifiable
limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority consistent with its
approach in Gibbons. But with the Court’s decision in Wickard v. Fil82
burn, those longstanding limits were fundamentally altered.
In Wickard, the Court upheld an amendment to the Agricultural
83
Adjustment Act of 1938, which imposed limitations on the production of wheat and other commodities, as a valid exercise of the com78

79

80

81

82
83

Id. Reading Gibbons as sanctioning anything approaching a substantial effects test ignores
Chief Justice Marshall’s treatment of inspection laws:
That inspection laws may have a remote and considerable influence on commerce, will not be denied; but that a power to regulate commerce is the source
from which the right to pass them is derived, cannot be admitted. The object of
inspection laws, is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labour of a
country . . . . They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign
commerce, or of commerce among the States . . . .
No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress . . . .
Id. at 203. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1402–05 (1987) (criticizing this reading).
See The Shreveport Rate Cases 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914) (“Congress . . . may prevent the
common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from being
used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce.”); The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) (holding that vessels in intrastate travel are subject to
interstate commerce regulations if carrying goods bound for or originating in out-of-state
markets).
See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (holding that “[t]he relation of
employer and employee” does not constitute interstate commerce); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that the manufacture of sugar and the regulation
of related monopolies were beyond the commerce power); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1
(1888) (holding that a statute banning the manufacture of liquor was not a regulation of
commerce).
See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that a prohibition against interstate shipment of goods manufactured with child labor exceeded Congress’s authority
because the goods themselves were not dangerous); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case),
188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding a statute prohibiting the transport of lottery tickets
across state lines).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Act of May 26, 1941, Pub. L. No. 74, 55 Stat. 203.
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84

merce power.
Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio farmer, argued that his
growing and harvesting of wheat in excess of the defined quota was
not the proper subject of federal regulation since the wheat grown on
his farm was exclusively put to his own private use and never entered
85
the stream of commerce, interstate or otherwise.
But the Court held that regulation of Filburn’s noncommercial
production and consumption of wheat was within the scope of Commerce Clause authority because Filburn’s use substantially affected
86
interstate commerce. Had he not grown the wheat, Filburn likely
would have purchased substitute wheat on the market. By opting out
of the market, Filburn and others like him decreased interstate demand and interfered with federal efforts to regulate nationwide pric87
es and supply.
After Wickard, discerning any limits on the commerce power became a difficult task. For decades, the Court consistently upheld
every statute challenged as an invalid exercise of the Commerce
88
89
Clause. Not until its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez did the
Court enforce any limits on the commerce power. In Lopez, the
Court held that the logical connection between carrying guns in
school zones and harm to interstate commerce was too attenuated to
90
support the Gun Free School Zones Act. The Court applied similar
logic five years later, striking down the Violence Against Women Act
91
in United States v. Morrison.

84

85
86

87
88

89
90
91

See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118–29 (discussing whether the Commerce Clause provides congressional authority to regulate the intrastate production and consumption of wheat and
concluding it does).
Id. at 118.
Id. at 128–29 (“This record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of
regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to
stimulate trade therein at increased prices.”). The substantial effects doctrine has its beginnings in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that activities that “have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions” are within the commerce power).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127.
After Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court invalidated only two such
acts, neither of which were held to exceed the internal limits of the Commerce Clause.
See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(relying on the Tenth Amendment).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 583.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Despite this brief flirtation with cabining the commerce power,
the Court’s most recent major Commerce Clause decision, Gonzales v.
92
Raich, reaffirmed Wickard as controlling precedent in cases addressing economic activity, broadly construed. Raich held that personal
production, possession, and consumption of marijuana for medical
purposes, much like Filburn’s wheat, contributed to “both the supply
and demand sides” of an interstate market and could thus be prohib93
ited under the Controlled Substances Act. At least for “economic”
94
activities, the commerce power continues to enjoy the broad scope
set out in Wickard.
This broad reading of the Commerce Clause greatly increases the
95
risk of inter-clause conflict. By encroaching upon formerly distinct
spheres of legislative authority, the modern commerce power risks
subsuming the remaining enumerated powers, and with them, their
limits. If, for example, the Commerce Clause gives Congress independent authority to regulate copyright and related rights—a field
that substantially affects interstate commerce—the internal limits of
Clause 8 could be rendered dead letters. The scope of Congress’s
commerce authority, therefore, forces a choice between the external
application of the limits of other legislative grants or the effective
elimination of constitutional text.

92
93
94

95

545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Id. at 30.
The Court was satisfied that the activity in Raich was economic despite the fact that the
marijuana in question had “never been bought or sold.” Id. at 57 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), offer one clear example of the creeping imperialism of the Commerce Clause and the resulting likelihood of conflicts with the limits of
Clause 8. There, the Court struck down Congress’s first attempt to create a federal
trademark statute. See Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (“An act to punish the
counterfeiting of trade-mark goods and the sale or dealing in of counterfeit trade-mark
goods.”). First, the Court concluded that trademark legislation—because it required no
originality or invention—could not be justified by Clause 8. The Court then determined
that the statute was also beyond Congress’s then-narrow commerce authority since the
legislation regulated non-interstate commerce. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 98. Because
the statute violated the limits of both sources of authority, the Court had no reason to
consider any potential conflicts between them. But reading the Trade-Mark Cases with an
appreciation of the broad scope of the modern commerce power, the looming interclause conflict between Clause 8 and the Commerce Clause is hard to miss. The relationship between contemporary trademark law and the limits of Clause 8 is addressed infra at
note 255.
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II. THE RULE AGAINST SUPERFLUITY AND INTER-CLAUSE CONFLICT
Without a coherent general approach, courts are left to resolve
each inter-clause conflict on an ad hoc basis, yielding inconsistent re96
sults that lack predictive value. This Part outlines a method for resolving inter-clause conflicts that preserves the limits on Congress’s
enumerated powers without forcing a wholesale rejection of the contemporary reading of the Commerce Clause. Under this approach,
the commerce power is free to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce so long as it does not strip the limits found
in other enumerated powers of their meaning. If legislation justified
under the commerce power would effectively eliminate text found

96

Other commentators have offered approaches that focus on the unique qualities of
Clause 8. Professors Heald and Sherry, for example, have proposed an approach for resolving such conflicts on the basis of historical evidence. Heald & Sherry, supra note 6, at
1128–37. They argue that the historical record suggests that Clause 8 was drafted and ratified against a backdrop that regarded federal power to grant monopolies with suspicion
and permitted such restraints only in limited and well-defined circumstances. Id. at
1144–47. Attempts to use the commerce power to circumvent those limits, therefore,
contradict the intent of the Framers.
Although this historical approach provides a compelling narrative, it is inconclusive.
Clause 8 was the subject of precious little recorded debate, during both the Convention
and ratification. Nachbar, supra note 48, at 292; Oliar, supra note 1, at 1790–91. Further,
the practices of the states, only two of which prohibited state-sanctioned monopolies, cast
some doubt on the the notion that monopolies were an overriding concern. Nachbar,
supra note 48, at 343. And although four states sought the inclusion of a prohibition
against the granting of exclusive rights in commerce in the Constitution, that suggestion
ultimately failed. Id. at 340, 343. In the end, given the incomplete and conflicting record, history alone serves as an insufficient guide in determining the external applicability of the limits of Clause 8.
Professor Patry, in contrast, has approached the issue of inter-clause conflict by characterizing Clause 8 as creating two sorts of rights—a “positive right” that vests in authors
and a “negative right” that permits the public to copy unoriginal material. Patry, supra
note 6, at 364–65. Legislation granting exclusive rights in unoriginal works—if enacted
pursuant to other enumerated powers—would not interfere with this positive right. But
such a grant would impermissibly impinge upon the public’s negative right.
Patry’s description of this inter-clause conflict is a powerful one. But to the extent his
argument justifies external application of Clause 8 limits on the basis of conflict with the
public’s negative right to copy, it begs the question. The issue is whether the limits in
Clause 8—the originality requirement among them—can constrain congressional action
under another grant of power. Reclassification of those limits as “negative rights” assumes the very proposition to be proven. A constitutional right, after all, is shorthand for
an interest that is protected from interference by otherwise permissible governmental or
private action. To claim that the limits in Clause 8 apply externally because they give rise
to negative rights merely restates the question in the form of an affirmative answer. Patry’s characterization of the public’s ability to copy unoriginal material is, in large measure, accurate. But, in the effort to distinguish between internal and external limits, the
existence of this right is a conclusion, not a premise.
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elsewhere in the Constitution, the Commerce Clause must yield to
those external limits.
But a rule against superfluous text cannot resolve inter-clause conflicts on its own. Courts still need a way to distinguish descriptions of
a particular enumerated power from limits that restrain other grants
of authority. As this Part explains, those distinctions can be drawn by
examining potential limits in the broader context of Congress’s legislative power as a whole. Through this comparative analysis, courts
will find that not all language that looks like a limit functions like
one.
A. Superfluity as a Trigger for External Limits
97

98

Interpretations of a document—whether a contract, patent, or
99
statute —that strip text of all meaning are strongly disfavored.
Courts assume that the authors of a document include each word or
phrase in order to effectuate their intent. Readings that render text
meaningless should be rejected in favor of constructions that give ef100
fect to all of the text in a document.

97

98

99

100

See, e.g., Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp. Supplemental Mgmt. Pension Plan, 7 F.3d 1091,
1095 (2d Cir. 1993) (“By examining the entire contract, we safeguard against adopting an
interpretation that would render any individual provision superfluous.”); Blake Constr.
Co. v. United States, 987 F.2d 743, 746–47 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An interpretation which
gives reasonable meaning to all parts of a contract is preferred to one which renders part
of it insignificant or useless.”); Ins. Co. of State of Pa. v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 922 F.2d
516, 522 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting the principle under California law that “[t]he whole of a
contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable,
each clause helping to interpret the other” (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1641 (West
1985))(alteration in original)).
See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A
claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one
that does not do so.”); Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d
1302, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (construing claim to avoid rendering a claim limitation superfluous).
See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (describing the rule against superfluity as a “cardinal principle of statutory construction” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 404 (2000))); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991)
(“[W]e construe statutes, where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts
thereof.”); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’” (quoting Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))).
See, e.g., United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751–52 (1st Cir. 1985) (“All words
and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and
no construction should be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous.”).
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Not surprisingly, the Court has looked to potential superfluity in
resolving questions of constitutional interpretation. Justice Thomas,
concurring with the judgment in Lopez, took issue with the Court’s
failure to explicitly reject Wickard for this very reason:
[O]n this Court’s understanding of congressional power under . . . [the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper] Clauses, many of Congress’ other
enumerated powers under Art. I, § 8, are wholly superfluous. After all, if
Congress may regulate all matters that substantially affect commerce,
there is no need for the Constitution to specify that Congress may enact
bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin money and fix the standard of weights and
measures, cl. 5, or punish counterfeiters of United States coin and securities, cl. 6. Likewise, Congress would not need the separate authority to
establish post offices and post roads, cl. 7, or to grant patents and copyrights, cl. 8, or to “punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas,” cl. 10. . . .
Put simply, much if not all of Art. I, § 8 (including portions of the
Commerce Clause itself), would be surplusage if Congress had been
given authority over matters that substantially affect interstate commerce.
An interpretation of cl. 3 that makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simply
101
cannot be correct.

Likewise, Railway Labor relied on the rule against superfluity. The
Court explained that RITA was impermissible under the Commerce
Clause because “hold[ing] that Congress had the power to enact
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce
Clause . . . would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the
102
power of Congress.” Regardless of the scope of Commerce Clause
authority, the Court refused to allow Congress to exercise that power
103
where doing so would render constitutional text superfluous.
Just as RITA threatened to eradicate the uniformity requirement
of the Bankruptcy Clause, a reading of the Commerce Clause that
permits Congress to evade the limits of Clause 8 would render those
104
limits meaningless.
Clause 8 enables exclusive rights that serve as
economic incentives for the invention and creation of goods distributed through interstate commerce. Congress, therefore, could presumably enact the Patent and Copyright Acts as they exist today using
its Commerce Clause authority, even if Clause 8 were stricken from
101
102
103
104

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588–89 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982).
Id.
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to Information Products: Muscling Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 230
(“Restrictions on constitutional grants of legislative power, such as the Copyright Clause,
would be meaningless if Congress could evade them simply by announcing that it was acting under some broader authority.”)
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105

the Constitution altogether. More importantly, a Commerce Clause
unrestrained by external limits would empower Congress to enact
legislation that disregards the limits of Clause 8—durational or otherwise. An expanded Commerce Clause unchecked by external limits, therefore, not only renders the positive authority of Clause 8 redundant, it also strips the limits of Clause 8 of all meaning.
This result stands in stark contrast with the Framers’ conception
of the respective roles of the Commerce Clause and Clause 8. Regardless of the precise scope of the commerce power, intellectual
property regimes of the sort found in the Patent and Copyright Acts
were thought to require a separate and additional source of author106
ity. Clause 8 provided that authority, but only within the strictures
of its limits.
Perhaps, as some have suggested, opponents of quasi-copyright
regimes that ignore Clause 8 limits should simply direct “their ire”
107
Certainly, one response to the nullification of
towards Wickard.
constitutional text by the expansion of the commerce power is to reject the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence altogether. But
short of abandoning the modern regulatory state in favor of a federal
government loyal to the Framers’ narrow understanding of the
Commerce Clause, this Article suggests an approach that may prove
more palatable to those reluctant to take the plunge into the deep
end of originalism.
In order to preserve meaningful limits while avoiding a strict and
potentially disruptive originalism, the rule against superfluity must be
applied any time the Commerce Clause would provide Congress with
108
authority denied by other enumerated powers.
This approach accommodates the evolution of the Commerce Clause, but it also imposes an important constraint on the outer limits of its expansion.

105
106
107
108

See Merges & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 63–64 (acknowledging this possibility).
See generally Oliar, supra note 1.
Nachbar, supra note 48, at 350 (implying that the broad interpretation of the commerce
power under Wickard makes Clause 8 powers superfluous).
Where the Commerce Clause provides an alternative source of authority to another legislative power, in a strict sense it renders that power superfluous. But to the extent the
commerce power is coextensive with the positive authority of another grant, the Commerce Clause confers Congress no additional power. To take an example familiar from
Railway Labor, assume the modern Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. This annexation of bankruptcy authority renders the positive authority provided by Clause 4 superfluous, but it does not alter the scope of Congress’s
overall authority. Regardless of the clause employed, Congress has the same authority—
to uniformly regulate bankruptcy.
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Where Congress uses the Commerce Clause to eliminate or ignore a
limit within another enumerated power, that limit must be applied
externally, and the commerce power must yield.
The Commerce Clause cannot annex the authority defined by
other enumerated powers if doing so would read the limits of those
clauses out of the Constitution. But it is free to fill the originalist
void—that region of legislative space not addressed by other enumerated powers. In large part, the expansion of the Commerce Clause
brought within the umbrella of federal regulation power that was not
addressed by other legislative powers. The regulation of environmental standards, employment practices, wired and wireless communications, corporate governance, and food and drugs, for example,
would remain well within congressional authority if limits on legislative authority were applied externally. The inclusion of these fields of
regulation within an expanded Commerce Clause, even if inconsistent with the Framers’ intent, creates no risk of superfluity. And so
long as the scope of the commerce power is confined to areas not already governed by a separate constitutional provision, the text of
each legislative grant will retain meaning.
But this approach faces an important hurdle. The rule against
superfluity applies with equal force to all external limits. In order for
courts to resolve inter-clause conflict, they must be capable of distinguishing external limits, which constrain other enumerated powers,
from internal limits, which merely describe the scope of a particular
grant of authority.
B. Identifying Limits on Enumerated Powers
Distinctions between internal and external limits on legislative authority cannot be drawn on the basis of text alone. Instead, these distinctions emerge when limits are analyzed in the broader context of
Congress’s legislative authority as a whole. Because external limits
constrain Congress’s power to act under other legislative grants, they
define relationships between clauses. The effect of a would-be limit,
therefore, cannot be judged without comparing it to the other pow109
ers it would act upon.

109

See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235 (1995) (“Read in isolation, most
of the Constitution’s provisions make only a highly limited kind of sense. Only as an interconnected whole do these provisions meaningfully constitute a frame of government . . . .”).

1104

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10:5

This comparative analysis begins with the clause containing the
potential external limit. Each clause confers upon Congress some
positive authority to legislate. The scope of that power is defined
primarily by its own limits. If those limits are merely descriptive, they
are silent about the reach of Congress’s other powers. But external
limits deny Congress some measure of authority. For example, the
Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws. But since the uniformity requirement is an external limit, it simultaneously denies Congress the power to enact non-uniform
bankruptcy laws.
Once the authority that a particular limit would deny Congress
has been identified, it should be compared to the authority granted
by the other enumerated powers. If another power grants Congress
the same authority that the limit would deny, that text cannot reasonably be considered an external limit. In other words, if the legislative power forbidden by the limits of the first clause is granted by
the positive authority of another clause, the first contains no enforce110
able external limits. But to the extent the authority forbidden by a
limit of one power is not permitted by any other legislative grant,
Congress should be precluded from acting in a manner that ignores
that limit.
The relationship between the sixth and tenth clauses of Section 8
offers perhaps the clearest instance of text that appears, in isolation,
to function as an external limit, but serves a purely descriptive purpose. Clause 6 authorizes Congress to “provide for the Punishment
111
of counterfeiting . . . [the currency] of the United States.”
If the
phrase “of the United States” functioned as an external limit, Congress would be precluded from punishing the counterfeiting of foreign currency. But a contextual analysis reveals that another enumerated power provided Congress the very authority putatively
denied by that phrase. Clause 10, which grants Congress authority to
112
“define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,” em110

111
112

This approach might help to clarify the apparent inter-clause conflict raised by the Civil
Rights Cases and Heart of Atlanta. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. The
Court's holding in the Civil Rights Cases relied on the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment enabled Congress to legislate with regard to state, but not private, action. Because
the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate private action, the legislative authority that would be denied by applying the state-action limitation of the Fourteenth
Amendment externally is squarely within Congress’s commerce power. The state-action
limit describes the scope of Congress’s additional power under the Fourteenth Amendment, not a restraint on the commerce power or its expansion.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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powers Congress to punish counterfeiters of foreign currency, as the
113
Court has long recognized. If Congress is entitled to punish counterfeiters of both foreign and domestic currency, the phrase “of the
United States” cannot be said to function as an external limit on con114
115
gressional authority.
This example, among others, demonstrates
that not all would-be limits actually constrain Congress from acting
under other grants of authority.
Some opponents of robust external limits suggest that they could
116
give rise to counterintuitive constraints on congressional power. If
Clause 10 empowers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,” is Congress precluded from pun117
ishing felonies that occur on land?
And if the power to establish
113

114

115

116
117

United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1887) (holding that the United States has
an obligation under the law of nations to protect foreign currency from counterfeiting).
Adding further support to the notion that these two clauses are not in tension is the fact
that in an early draft of the Constitution, the power over “the Punishment of counterfeiting . . . the Coin of the United States” and “[the punishment] of Offences against the Law
of Nations” were contained in the same clause. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 168, 182 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
Conceivably, state currency could constitute non-U.S. currency. During the colonial period, states coined their own currency. See, e.g., Louis Jordan, Colonial Currency,
http://www.coins.nd.edu/ColCurrency/CurrencyText/Contents.html (last visited Mar.
31, 2008) (providing photographs of and explanations for the developments of colonial
currency). But this reading is foreclosed by the Constitution itself; with ratification, the
states ceded their authority to “coin Money; [emit] Bills of Credit; [and] make any Thing
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
The Court has also resolved potential conflicts between Congress’s power to “raise and
support Armies” and the Militia Clauses by recognizing that the Militia Clauses are subsumed within Congress’s broad power under Clause 12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12,
15, 16. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), the Court upheld a challenge
to a selective military draft. Potential draftees argued that the statute was inconsistent
with the limitations of the Militia Clauses, which permit Congress to call forth the militia
“to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. The Court found that the power to raise an Army gave Congress
“complete authority” over the creation and funding of the military. Draft Law Cases, 245
U.S. at 382. The Militia Clauses, therefore, serve only as an alternate means by which
Congress can establish a military force, one that requires less than the full measure of its
authority. The Militia Clauses simply “diminished the occasion for the exertion by Congress of its military power beyond the strict necessities for its exercise by giving the power
to Congress to direct the organization and training of the militia.” Id. at 383; see also Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 349 (1990) (“[F]ar from being a limitation on [the
powers to ‘provide for the common Defence,’ ‘raise and support Armies,’ [and] ‘make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces’], the Militia
Clauses are—as the constitutional text plainly indicates—additional grants of power . . . .”).
See Nachbar, supra note 48, at 295.
Clause 10 grants Congress authority to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. If “high Seas” functions as an external limit, it could preclude punishing those same offenses on land. Since many federal
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criminal statutes are justified under the Commerce Clause, this limit would place a significant constraint on Congress’s commerce power. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice:
The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 656 (1997) (explaining that Congress usually relies on its commerce power to enact federal criminal law). But the “high
Seas” language functions primarily descriptively and, even at the time of ratification, imposed no limit on Congress’s power to define and punish crimes on land, whatever the
scope of Congress’s authority to enact criminal laws.
Two primary definitions of the phrase “high seas” emerge from the historical record.
The first and narrower of these definitions recognizes three distinct zones of navigable
waters: inland, or internal waters; the territorial sea, comprised of those waters along a
nation’s shores; and the high seas, which are international waters outside the territorial
sea and not within the dominion of any particular nation. See United States v. Louisiana,
394 U.S. 11, 22–23 (1969) (recognizing the international tradition distinguishing these
three zones); The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403 (1907) (describing the high seas as “outside the territory in a place belonging to no other sovereign”); The “Scotland,” 105 U.S.
24, 29 (1881) (noting that on the high seas, “the law of no particular State has exclusive
force, but all are equal”); United States v. Jackson, 26 F. Cas. 558, 559 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843)
( . . . .“[T]he high seas were, properly speaking, within the territory of no state or country”); United States v. Morel, 26 F. Cas. 1310, 1312 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1834) (“[T]he high
sea . . . is that which is . . . under the particular right or jurisdiction of no sovereign . . . .”).
If the high seas were understood to exclude coastal territorial waters and inland waters, application of “high Seas” as an external limit may not implicate congressional authority over crimes committed on terra firma at all. Instead, “high Seas” would remove
from Congress’s reach the power to define and punish crimes that occur in the sea just
off of the coast of a state or within its bays and inlets. This reading, however, is inconsistent with legislation enacted by the First Congress, which punished crimes committed not
only “upon the high seas” but also “in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.” Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113.
Justice Story provided a second, and significantly broader, definition of the high seas
as “the waters on the sea coast below low water mark, whether within the territorial boundaries of a foreign nation, or of a domestic state.” See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1159, at 56 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co.
1833). In other words, the high seas include “that part of the ocean, which washes the
sea-coast, and is without the body of any county [sic], according to the common law.” Id.
at 57. This definition, although disfavored by subsequent courts, was adopted in a number of early cases. Compare United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 94 (1820)
(defining the high seas as “the ocean which washes a coast”), with In re Air Crash Off
Long Island, 209 F.3d 200, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that high seas
means “beyond the low-water mark”).
If this definition of “high Seas” served as an external limit, Congress could face a bar
to punishing crimes on land. Since a “piracy” is, by definition, a “robbery upon the sea,”
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820), the class of piracies that occur
on land is a null set. Felonies, on the other hand, included all crimes punished by the
forfeiture of land or property at common law, particularly those for which capital punishment could be imposed. See STORY, supra at, § 1155. So a prohibition against legislation punishing felonies on land would indeed be a genuine and significant limit on Congress’s power.
But a review of the remainder of the Constitution and the legislation enacted by the
First Congress reveals that no limit interfered with the punishment of felonies on land.
Article III, Section 3 provides Congress with the power to punish treason, a power the
First Congress exercised by imposing capital punishment for traitors. Act of Apr. 30,
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“post Roads” contains an external limit, is Congress barred from cre118
ating other sorts of roads? But once these potential limits are com-

118

1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112, 112. Likewise, the First Congress exercised the power granted
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 6 by punishing counterfeiting with death. Id. § 14. The
First Congress also defined and punished murder, dismemberment, and theft both on
the high seas and on federal land. Id. §§ 3, 13, 16. These forays into criminal law—along
with punishing theft of the mail and perjury—traditionally have been understood as exercises of the Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819).
So even if limits on enumerated powers apply externally, Congress remains free to
enact criminal laws targeting activities that occur on land. The precise scope of Congress’s power to criminalize behavior by use of the commerce power is beyond the scope
of this Article. But if that power is to be limited, it is certainly not on the basis of the high
seas requirement of Clause 10.
Clause 7 grants Congress the power to “establish Post Offices and post Roads.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. If “post Roads” serves as a limit on congressional authority and is
applied externally to constrain commerce legislation, Congress could be barred from establishing roads other than post roads. But that fear is unjustified.
Clause 7 can be read in two ways. Some contend that the establishment of a post
road permitted nothing more than the designation of preexisting roads for carrying the
post. See STORY, supra note 117, § 1123. This reading conforms to early congressional
practice. See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232 (establishing a post office and post
roads within the United States); Act of Apr. 21, 1806, ch. 55, 2 Stat. 408 (establishing additional post roads within the United States). This reading also found support in some
early opinions. See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 181 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (noting that the postal power “confers no right to open new roads, but implies
nothing beyond . . . the selection amongst various routes . . . most judicious to have the
mails transported”); United States v. R.R. Bridge Co., 27 F. Cas. 686, 689 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1855) (stating that the postal power is “exhausted in the designation of roads on which
the mails are to be transported”). Under this reading, Clause 7 is entirely silent on the
construction of roads and can impose no bar on Commerce Clause authority.
But this narrow use of “establish” is at odds with the meaning of the term elsewhere
in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (authorizing Congress to “ordain and establish” inferior courts); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”). The Court embraced a more robust reading
of the power to “establish” post offices and post roads that included creation as well as designation. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875).
If Clause 7 provides authority to create post roads, does a prohibition against the creation of non-post roads impose a meaningful limit on Congress? History makes certain
that in order for a road to be considered a post road its sole or even primary use need not
be the transportation of the post. The Cumberland Road is emblematic of the broad
sweep of the postal power. See Act of Mar. 29, 1806, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 357 (providing for the
construction of the Cumberland road from Maryland to Ohio); Act of Apr. 28, 1810, ch.
30, 2 Stat. 579, 584 (providing for the extension of the Cumberland Road). The federal
government not only funded its creation, but directly oversaw its construction. The
road’s simultaneous and primary use as a channel for travelers and commodities did not
prevent Congress from exercising its postal power.
What then is a non-post road? Given the scope of the postal power and the pervasive
reach of the post, the class of non-post roads is exceedingly small. But to the extent the
theoretical need for non-post roads remains a concern, long before Wickard, courts recognized Congress’s power to create roads pursuant to the commerce power. See California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 39 (1888) (“The power to construct, or to authorize
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pared to Congress’s other legislative authority, it becomes clear that
these rhetorical counterexamples offer little substantive criticism.
This comparative analysis, it should be noted, incorporates a certain degree of originalist bias. If this analysis occurred against the
backdrop of the modern Commerce Clause, it would likely demonstrate that no limits on Congress’s power apply externally. After all,
whatever authority those limits would deny Congress would be within
the scope of another enumerated power, namely the Commerce
Clause. In order for this analysis to resolve inter-clause conflicts, the
comparison should proceed from a reference point that does not
take the modern commerce power as given. Otherwise, it would ignore the very expansion of legislative power that gives rise to interclause conflict in the first place. The resolution of these conflicts, after all, is largely meant to gauge the legitimacy of Commerce Clause
expansion into zones otherwise governed by other grants of authority. To embed that expansion into the comparative backdrop only
begs the question.
Even if courts are able to distinguish external limits from their internal counterparts, they still must determine whether a particular
external limit is implicated by a challenged statute. That task is discussed below.
C. Mapping Challenged Statutes on the Constitutional Topography
Statutes must conform to the external limits implicated by their
subject matters; they are not subject to external limits that address
unrelated areas of regulation. Legislation that alters the relationship
between debtors and their creditors must conform to the uniformity
requirement, but a civil rights bill cannot be challenged for its lack of
uniformity. Nor could an act imposing environmental standards be
held to exceed Congress’s power because it failed to satisfy the lim-

individuals or corporations to construct, national highways and bridges from State to
State, is essential to the complete control and regulation of interstate commerce.”); see also Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 194 (1910) (holding that the
erection of a bridge is within “the paramount power of Congress to regulate commerce
among the States”).
But the postal power did provide Congress with some authority that the pre-Wickard
Commerce Clause could not. Many early post roads were entirely intrastate, and therefore beyond the scope of the commerce power. So to the extent “post Roads” serves as a
limit to legislation enacted under the modern Commerce Clause, at most it precludes
Congress from creating intrastate roads on which the post will never be carried. As a
practical matter, external application of that limit would not impede Congress in any
meaningful way.
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ited times requirement of Clause 8. These examples, while perhaps
frivolous, demonstrate that if a statute falls so far afield from the subject matter of a particular grant, the statute need not conform to the
external limits of that clause. But not all examples are quite so obvious. Distinguishing commercial regulations from taxes, bankruptcy
laws, or copyright laws, for example, is not as easy a task.
The Court’s prior forays into inter-clause conflict offer some guidance. In both Railway Labor and the Head Money Cases, the Court was
asked to determine whether the limits of one grant of authority were
applicable to legislation arguably justified under the Commerce
Clause. Although the Court reached different conclusions in these
two cases, it approached the question in similar ways. In both cases,
the Court saw its primary task as determining which of the two grants
served as the true source of Congress’s authority to enact the challenged legislation.
In order to decide if the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause rendered RITA unconstitutional, the Railway Labor
Court thought it “necessary first to determine whether
the . . . [statute was] an exercise of Congress’ power under the Bank119
ruptcy Clause . . . or under the Commerce Clause.” Acknowledging
120
that this determination was “not an easy task,” the Court began by
considering the subject matter of the Bankruptcy Clause, which contained the limit in question. Bankruptcy, according to the Court, is
the “subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or
fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their re121
lief.”
Having defined the subject matter of the Bankruptcy Clause, the
Court asked whether RITA fell within it. The Court looked to two
factors in making this determination. First, it considered the purpose
and effect of the statute as revealed through its text. Because the statute “prescribe[d] the manner in which the property of the Rock Island estate [was] to be distributed among its creditors,” it functioned
122
as a bankruptcy law. Second, the Court considered the statute’s legislative history and the events surrounding its enactment. Since Congress announced its intention that “employee protection be imposed

119
120
121
122

Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465 (1982). For further details on
this case, see supra notes 35–49 and accompanying text.
Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. at 465.
Id. at 466 (quoting Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1938)).
Id. at 467.
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in bankruptcy proceedings involving major rail carriers” only after
Rock Island initiated reorganization proceedings, the Court was confident that RITA reflected an exercise of the bankruptcy power.
124
The Head Money Cases took a similar approach. There, the Court
had to determine whether the uniformity requirement of Clause 1
applied to the fifty-cent fee charged to ship operators. Because the
statute at issue appeared to regulate foreign commerce, but also lev125
ied a duty, the rubrics of both taxation and commercial regulation
offered potential justifications.
The Court began, much as it did in Railway Labor, by considering
whether the legislation at issue was an exercise of the commerce
power or the taxation power. The Head Money Court determined that
“the power exercised in this instance is not the taxing power,” but in126
stead the Commerce Clause. Because “the real purpose and effect
of the statute . . . . from beginning to end . . . [was] to mitigate the
evils inherent in the business of bringing foreigners to this coun127
try,” the 1882 Act, like similar regulations of commerce, “was not
subject . . . to the rules which would invalidate an ordinary tax pure
128
and simple.” Nonetheless, perhaps in recognition of the difficulty
inherent in delineating the precise scope of these sources of authority, the Court upheld the statute only after satisfying itself that the requirements of the taxing power, which it claimed were inapplicable,
129
were indeed satisfied.
These two cases, although separated by nearly one hundred years,
share some common traits. First, both Courts implicitly embraced
the notion that the limits of one clause can constrain legislation otherwise permissible under another. Second, both cases treated the
question of the source of Congress’s authority as an initial, and largely determinative, inquiry. If Congress acted pursuant to the power
containing the relevant limit, the statute was unconstitutional. But if
the legislation was better classified as a commercial regulation, it was
permissible.
In adopting this approach, both cases relied on a potentially problematic common assumption—that only one legislative power can
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 468.
112 U.S. 580 (1884). For further details on this case, see supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S at 589.
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id. at 596.
Id.
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serve as the true source of congressional authority to enact any particular statute. The Head Money Court, operating before the Commerce Clause had reached its full ebb, reasonably understood that
Congress’s enumerated powers were distinct and non-overlapping.
But the expansion of the commerce power complicates efforts by
courts to identify the one true source of Congress’s power. Legislation that once could have been enacted pursuant to only one congressional power can now, in many instances, reasonably lay claim to
an alternate source of authority.
Against the backdrop of the sweeping reach of the Commerce
Clause and the external limits that cabin its expansion, what does it
mean to ask which power Congress has exercised in enacting legislation? In short, courts must situate challenged statutes within the
complex topography of overlapping legislative powers and their external limits.
Mapping this topography of legislative powers requires courts to
recognize that the logical space occupied by a particular grant is not
defined solely by its positive authority. Instead, it is comprised of a
central nucleus of positive authority, surrounded by a space defined
by the clause’s external limits. A given statute then can fall into one
of three regions on the topography of legislative powers with respect
to any particular clause. First, a statute that satisfies the limits of a
particular clause and addresses its core subject matter falls within the
positive authority of that clause. In these scenarios, Congress is entitled to act. Second, a statute that addresses the core subject matter of
an enumerated power, but violates one or more of its external limits,
falls within the penumbra surrounding the positive authority of that
clause. In that case, Congress has no authority to enact the statute,
regardless of the power it seeks to use. Otherwise, legislation could
escape the external limits of a clause simply by virtue of violating
them. Third, when the purpose and function of a statute do not address the core subject matter of a particular enumerated power, that
statute is beyond the reach of the external limits of that power.
Taken together, the contours of each grant of positive authority
and their corresponding penumbras define the topography of Congress’s legislative authority. When a court asks which of two enumerated powers serves as the source of authority for a given act, at bottom, the court is asking where that act falls within this topography.
In other words, does the purpose and function of the statute in question fall far enough away from the core concern of the grant so as to
be free of its limits? The next Part sketches both the limits and core
subject matter of Clause 8.
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III. DEFINING THE CLAUSE 8 PENUMBRA
Clause 8 confers upon Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
130
and Discoveries.”
Unlike other enumerated powers, neither the
positive authority nor the precise limits of Clause 8 are immediately
apparent from its text. This Part identifies the limiting text of Clause
8, sketches the basic restraints it places on Congress’s copyright authority, and considers whether those limits apply externally to constrain the Commerce Clause. This Part concludes that the limits of
Clause 8 delineate a zone of potential legislation that runs afoul of
the Constitution regardless of the power under which Congress intends to act. This zone defines the penumbral public domain.
A. The Limits of the Copyright Power
The text of Clause 8 is unique among Congress’s enumerated
powers in several respects. First, Clause 8 incorporates two separate
grants of authority. Congress’s power to “promote the Progress of
Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive
131
Right to their . . . Writings” traditionally has been embodied in the
Copyright Act, while the power to “promote the Progress of . . . [the]
useful Arts . . . by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the ex132
clusive Right to their . . . Discoveries” has been exercised through
133
the Patent Act.
While other enumerated powers include multiple
130
131
132
133

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id.
Id.
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884) (“Under the acts of
Congress designed to give effect to [Clause 8], the persons who are to be benefited are
divided into two classes, authors and inventors. The monopoly which is granted to the
former is called a copyright, that given to the latter, letters patent, or, in the familiar language of the present day, patent right.”); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 684
(1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“This article is to be construed distributively, and
must have been so understood; for when congress came to execute this power by legislation, the subjects are kept distinct, and very different provisions are made respecting
them.”); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1951)
(“[T]he Constitution differentiates (a) ‘authors’ and their ‘writings’ from (b) ‘inventors’
and their ‘discoveries.’”); Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99 (7th
Cir. 1943) (identifying “two separate and distinct fields of protection, the copyright and
the patent”); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 365, 367, 367 n.6 (2000) (“Article I . . . contains the patent clause, and reads as follows: ‘The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
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134

distinct grants of authority, the two grants within Clause 8 are not
explicitly distinguished in the text. Second, Clause 8 is unique in that
135
it includes both a “means” clause and an “ends” clause.
The first
half of Clause 8—the to “promote the Progress” language—serves as
the purpose of the grant, while the latter half—the “by secur136
ing . . . exclusive Right[s]”
language—functions to set out the
means by which that end is achieved. Finally, Clause 8, unlike most
other grants, includes multiple potential limits on Congress’s authority. Whereas Congress’s bankruptcy and naturalization powers, for
example, must simply satisfy the requirement of uniformity, Clause 8
includes a series of limitations on the scope of congressional authority. Each of these potential external limits are discussed below.
1. “Promote the Progress”
The first potential external limit of Clause 8, to “promote the Progress of Science,” has been read by courts and scholars in a variety of
137
ways—as a limit, a grant, neither, and both.
First, this text has been understood as a limit that precludes Congress from exercising its power to grant exclusive rights whenever
such rights would fail to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. This reading finds its strongest support in Graham v. John
Deere Co., where the Court explained that Clause 8 serves as “both a
grant of power and a limitation” and that “Congress in the exercise of
the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the
138
stated constitutional purpose.”

134
135

136
137
138

respective Writings and Discoveries. . . .’ The parallel construction makes it easy to identify the copyright clause: ‘The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive right to
their . . . Writings.’”); Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes
from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1937 n.103 (2007) (noting that the use
of the term “respective” in connection to the “Writings and Discoveries” of “Authors and
Inventors” lends support to this reading). But see Oliar, supra note 1, at 1789–90 n.98,
1823 n.228 (noting that historical evidence casts some doubt on a clear dichotomy between the patent and copyright powers of Clause 8).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4, 5, 10.
See Dan T. Coenen & Paul J. Heald, Means/Ends Analysis in Copyright Law: Eldred v. Ashcroft in One Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 99, 106 (2002) (“[W]hen Congress grants copyright
protection it can’t rely on any source of authority other than the Intellectual Property
Clause. Usually Article I grants of power are not deemed exclusive in this way.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Oliar, supra note 1, at 1781–84 (discussing the opposing interpretations).
383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966); see also Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604
F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing the limited judicial role in judging whether
Congress has exceeded its Article I powers); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
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Others read this text, not as a limit on Congress’s authority, but as
139
the very core of the power granted by Clause 8.
The Bankruptcy
Clause confers upon Congress the power to “establish . . . uniform
140
And the Commerce Clause
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.”
141
grants the power to “regulate Commerce.” Likewise, one could argue, Clause 8 confers upon Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.” The remainder of the clause,
under this view, simply spells out the permissible mechanisms for doing so. Although this reading of the clause is in keeping with the
grammatical structure of the rest of Section 8, it has not served as the
dominant interpretation.
The prevailing view rejects both of these readings and instead
treats the first half of Clause 8 as a mere preamble that serves as neither a grant of authority nor a limit on congressional power. The ascendancy of this view appears to owe its origins, at least in part, to a
142
rather weakly supported passage from Nimmer on Copyright. Despite
the questionable provenance of this reading, courts considering the
question have generally followed Nimmer and given the “promote
the Progress” language no binding effect, arguably stripping this text
143
of any meaning.
More recently, Professor Oliar—on the basis of Madison and
Pinckney’s original proposals at the Constitutional Convention—has
persuasively argued for a reading of “promote the Progress” that rec144
ognizes it as both a grant of authority and a limit. According to this
view, the positive authority of Clause 8 is defined by the overlap of its
means and ends clauses. Clause 8 grants Congress authority “[t]o
promote the Progress” precisely where it does so by exercising its au-

139

140
141
142

143

144

Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The Congress acts under the restraint imposed by the statement of purpose in Art. I, § 8.”).
See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §3:5 (2008) (discussing the proposition that
the word “promote” serves as a grant of congressional power and is synonymous with “encourage” and “advance”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2008). (“This
introductory phrase is in the main explanatory of the purpose of copyright, without in itself constituting a rigid standard against which any copyright act must be measured . . . . rather than constituting a limitation on Congressional authority, has for the
most part tended to expand such authority.” (citation omitted)).
Edward C. Walterscheid, “Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant”: Constitutional Limitations on the Patent Power, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 326 (2002) (arguing that treating the
first half of Clause 8 as a preamble renders it superfluous).
See Oliar, supra note 1, at 1816–18 (arguing that Clause 8 limits Congress’s power but also
excludes Congress from using other means to exercise that power).
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thority “[to secure] exclusive Right[s]” to “Authors and Inventors” in
accordance with the other limits inherent in Clause 8.
Assuming that this text functions not as a preamble but, at least in
part, as a limit on Clause 8 authority, what does it mean “to promote
the Progress of Science”? The term “Science,” as used in the Constitution, is not limited to the modern understanding of the term: the
system or process of acquiring knowledge about natural phenom145
ena. Rather—true to its Latin root scientia—“Science” refers more
broadly to “[k]nowledge acquired by study; acquaintance with or
146
mastery of any department of learning.” This limit, then, requires
147
148
Congress to encourage or further the advancement of knowledge
or learning when exercising its Clause 8 power. But as discussed in149
fra, the practical implications of such a limit are ambiguous at best.
2. “Limited Times”
The second potential external limit arises from the requirement
that Congress grant exclusive rights pursuant to Clause 8 only for
“limited Times.” Perhaps more so than any other Clause 8 text, the
“limited Times” requirement intuitively appears to function as a limit
on congressional authority.
150
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court directly addressed the constraints
this text places on Congress’s Clause 8 authority. There, the Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to the Sonny Bono Copyright
151
Term Extension Act of 1998, in part, on the grounds that the retroactive extension of the term of protection for existing works did not
152
violate the “limited Times” requirement.
According to the Court,
this requirement does not mean that the term of copyright protec145
146

147

148

149
150
151
152

See AMERICAN HERITAGE SCIENCE DICTIONARY, available at http://dictionary.reference.co
m/browse/science (last viewed August 28, 2007).
Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power To Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 48 (2002) (quoting 14 J.A. SIMPSON & E.S.C. WEINER, THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 648 (2d ed. 1989)).
See id. at 45; see also Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (“[The Act of 1790]
was passed for the purpose of encouraging useful invention . . . .”); Mitchell v. Tilghman,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 418 (1873) (“Patent laws have for their leading purpose the encouragement of useful inventions.”).
Solum, supra note 147, at 45–46 (discussing that the First Congress likely believed that
promoting the progress meant encouraging that activity). But see Pollack, supra note 1, at
760 (discussing potential alternative meanings for progess).
See infra Part IV.A.
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222 (holding that the “limited Times” prescription was not violated).
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153

tion, once granted, is “forever fixed or inalterable.”
Instead, the
term of a grant of exclusive rights is limited if it is “confine[d] within
154
certain bounds.” At the very least, both the Eldred majority and its
dissenters would agree that an expressly perpetual copyright would
155
violate the “limited Times” requirement.
Although this minimal
constraint on congressional authority does not offer a particularly robust reading of “limited Times,” it does provide a bright-line rule that
156
could call into question existing federal legislation.
3. “Authors”
The word “Authors” gives rise to two distinct limits on Congress’s
Clause 8 authority. First, it identifies the class of those to whom exclusive rights can be granted. Second, it limits the grant of exclusive
rights to works that exhibit some minimal level of originality.
The exclusive rights permitted by Clause 8 may not vest in whomever Congress chooses. If Congress extends exclusive rights under its
copyright power, those rights must vest in the author of the protected
work. An “author” in the constitutionally relevant sense is “he to
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes
157
a work of science or literature.” Congress could not, for example,
employ its Clause 8 power to enact a copyright lottery that selects
random citizens as the lucky recipients of copyrights in newly created
works. Such legislation would exceed Congress’s power since the exclusive rights granted are not given to those responsible for creating
the protected works.
From this definition of “author” as the originator of a work, courts
have understood Clause 8 to impose a distinct and fundamental limit
158
on the scope of copyright protection.
As the Court made clear in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. when it refused to
extend copyright protection to unoriginal compilations of data, the

153
154
155
156
157

158

Id. at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 209–10 (discussing the Court’s renewal of
copyright extentions nothwithstanding the “limited Times” requirement).
See infra Part IV.C.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); see also Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B.D. 627, 635 (1883) (U.K. ) (Cotton, L.J., concurring) (stating that authorship
requires “originating, making, [or] producing”).
CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he requirement of originality is a constitutional one inherent in the grant to Congress of the power to promote science and the useful arts . . . .”); Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir.
1995) (“Originality is both a statutory and constitutional requirement.”).
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Constitution demands originality.
As a constitutional matter, a
copyrightable work must be independently created—rather than copied from another—and exhibit “at least some minimal degree of
161
creativity.”
162
Feist cites two decisions, the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles Li163
thographic Co. v. Sarony, as the judicial foundation of the originality
164
requirement. According to the Feist Court, Burrow-Giles understood
“Authors” as the situs of that requirement, while the Trade-Mark Cases
165
rooted that same limit in the word “Writings.” Feist was correct that
these two cases articulated a constitutional originality requirement.
But the Court misread the Trade-Mark Cases by suggesting it understood the originality requirement as a product of the term “Writings.”
Rather, the Trade-Mark Cases, like Burrow-Giles, located the originality
requirement in the term “Authors.”
Justice Samuel F. Miller authored the unanimous opinions in the
166
Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles in 1879 and 1884, respectively.
Aside from the rather puzzling insistence that two decisions written
by the same justice, and decided within five years of each other,
would locate the same constitutional requirement in two different
terms, Feist’s reading of the Trade-Mark Cases fails to recognize its
close ties to the Court’s subsequent, and perhaps more explicit, reasoning in Burrow-Giles.
As discussed supra, the Trade-Mark Cases struck down Congress’s
167
first attempt to enact federal trademark protection. In considering
whether trademarks could be considered “writings of authors,” Justice
Miller found that the term “writings” had been “liberally construed”
to include not only books, maps, and charts, but also engravings, and
168
prints.
But regardless of the broad scope of “writings,” trademark
protection could find no support in Clause 8 since its power extended only to “writings of authors”—those “such as are original, and
169
are founded in the creative powers of the mind.”
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a constitutional requirement.”).
This constitutional mandate is incorporated into the current Copyright Act, which permits protection only for “original works of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
100 U.S. 82 (1879).
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
Id. at 346–47.
See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 82; Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 53
See supra note 95.
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
Id.
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Justice Miller drew a distinction between the class of all writings
and the subset of writings of authors. The first refers to those works
sufficiently tangible to be eligible for copyright protection. The second refers to those writings that, in addition to being reduced to
physical form, exhibit originality. Not all writings are constitutionally
eligible for copyright protection. Instead, “[t]he writings which are
170
to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor.” As the Court’s distinction suggests, a work may be written but not original. Protectable
works are not simply writings, but the writings of authors. The term
“Authors,” according to the Court, demands originality.
In Burrow-Giles, Justice Miller relied on similar reasoning. There,
the Court considered a claim of copyright infringement brought by
171
the photographer of a portrait of Oscar Wilde.
The alleged infringer argued that no copyright could subsist in the photograph
172
since it was “not a writing of which the producer is the author.”
The Court rejected this contention, first recognizing that the photo173
Since
graphs fell within the broad scope of the term “Writings.”
photographs qualify as writings, they are protectable “so far as they
are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the au174
thor.” Once again, the implicit distinction between “Writings” and
“writings of authors” is at work. The Court admitted the possibility
that some photographs, despite satisfying the writings requirement,
175
may lack originality. Only writings that clear the additional hurdle
176
of originality merit protection.
The term “Authors” imposes two very different constraints on
Congress’s Clause 8 authority. It requires that Congress grant exclusive rights in expression only to authors, and it insists that works subject to those exclusive rights be original.

170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54 (1884).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59. Given the photographer’s creative contributions, the Court was satisfied that
the Wilde portrait was “the product of plaintiff’s intellectual invention, of which plaintiff
is the author.” Id. at 60. Those contributions included “posing the said Oscar Wilde in
front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various
accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines,
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression . . . .” Id.

June 2008]

PENUMBRAL PUBLIC DOMAIN

1119

4. “Writings”
Although the term “Writings” does not serve as the source of the
originality requirement, it does impose an additional limit on Congress’s Clause 8 authority. It guarantees that the exclusive rights
granted to authors apply only to works embodied in some tangible
form of expression, rather than extending to fleeting and ephemeral
performances and utterances.
Read literally, “Writings” likely refers only to the “literary produc177
tions of . . . authors.” But both Congress and the courts have traditionally adopted a flexible and expansive understanding of “Writings.” The 1790 Act protected maps and charts, in addition to
178
books.
Subsequent legislation significantly expanded the scope of
179
180
181
writings to include prints, musical and dramatic compositions,
182
183
184
185
photographs,
paintings,
drawings,
sculptures,
motion pic186
187
tures, and sound recordings.
This expansion was enabled by a definition of “Writings” that offered the generality and adaptability necessary to accommodate
technological advances. That definition, first provided by the Court
in Burrow-Giles, embraced “all forms of writing, printing, engraving,
etching, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given
188
visible expression.”
Nearly a century later, the Court adopted a
similar reading in Goldstein v. California, explaining that “the word
‘writings’ . . . may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of
189
the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”
Despite the flexibility of these definitions, the Court has maintained at least one unyielding limit on the outer boundary of “Writings” protectable under Clause 8. Copyright has not and cannot extend to those works that have not been reduced to some tangible

177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 58.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 26, 2 Stat. 171.
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230 § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
Id.
Id.
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488.
Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
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190

physical representation.
Congress has never protected such works
191
under copyright law and explicitly acknowledged this limit in 1954
192
when it refused to submit to the Berne Convention. According to
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it was “impossible to
subscribe to the Convention” because it required “protection of ‘oral’
works, such as speeches [that] would have conflicted with Article I,
193
Section 8 . . . .” Indeed, the United States agreed to join the Berne
Convention only after a revision allowed member countries to deny
194
protection to works not fixed in a tangible medium.
“Writings,” like each of the limits above, constrains Congress’s
power to enact legislation pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.
But the question of whether those limits should be interpreted to limit Congress’s authority under other enumerated powers remains.
B. External Application of Clause 8 Limits
In order to determine whether the limits of the copyright authority of Clause 8 restrain Congress’s other legislative powers, we first
need to identify the core subject matter of that authority. If, prior to
Commerce Clause expansion, another enumerated power enabled
Congress to legislate with regard to that subject matter in a manner
inconsistent with Clause 8 limits, those limits function merely descriptively. If, on the other hand, no other enumerated powers permitted
Congress to reach the subject matter of Clause 8’s copyright authority, those limits externally constrain Congress regardless of the power
it attempts to use.
While identifying the subject matter of other enumerated powers,
like the Bankruptcy Clause, is a fairly straightforward task, Clause 8
presents a more difficult case, in part because of its unique structure.
190

191

192

193
194

In the current Copyright Act, this limit is expressed by the fixation requirement, which
demands “embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, . . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit [the work] to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Though unconstitutional for conferring on unwritten performances exclusive rights that
are functionally equivalent to copyrights, the federal anti-bootlegging statutes, discussed
at length in infra Part IV.C., did not attempt to protect those works through copyright
proper.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27,
1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 5 (1954).
See Berne Convention, supra note 193, art. 2(2). The United States entered into the
Berne Convention on March 1, 1989. Id.
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The power conferred by Clause 8 could be situated in either its ends
clause or its means clause. The location of Clause 8 power, and, by
extension, the definition of the core subject matter of Clause 8’s
copyright authority could prove determinative of the question of external application of Clause 8 limits.
If Clause 8 is characterized as the power to “promote the Progress
of Science,” one could argue that the limits of Clause 8 are not properly externalized. Even before the modern Commerce Clause
emerged, Congress could encourage “Science” through a variety of
means. For example, legislation enacted in 1798 permitted the appointment of four “teachers of the arts and sciences” for military in195
struction.
And just a few years later, Congress enacted legislation
enabling the President to establish the United States Military Acad196
emy at West Point.
Likewise, Congress promoted the progress of
197
science with the Morrill Act of 1862, which provided states with fed198
eral land to establish colleges and universities. The Morrill Act con199
fronted constitutional challenges during congressional debate.
Some argued that Clause 8, by defining the exclusive means of pro200
moting the progress of science, precluded the passage of the Act.
But in the end, the Morrill Act was successfully justified on the basis
201
of Congress’s power to dispose of federal land. If the core power of
Clause 8 is the promotion of progress and alternative means of progress promotion were within Congress’s legislative authority, the limits of Clause 8 cannot externally restrain Congress.
But there is good reason to doubt a reading that situates the power of Clause 8 exclusively in the ends clause. Such a reading fails to
account for the functional authority Congress was granted and has
exercised under Clause 8. Each enumerated power enables Congress
to take some concrete legislative action—to regulate commerce, to
raise an army, to coin money. However, in isolation, the power to

195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Sidney Forman, Why the United States Military Academy Was Established in 1802, 29 MIL. AFFS.
16, 22 (1965).
7 ANNALS OF CONG. 1312, § 27 (1802); accord Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 27, 2 Stat. 132,
137.
Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503; see also Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417.
Notably, the Framers rejected a direct federal power to establish universities. See Oliar,
supra note 1, at 1792.
See generally John H. Florer, Major Issues in the Congressional Debate of the Morrill Act of 1862,
8 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 459 (1968).
See id. at 463.
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States . . . .”).
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“promote the Progress” supplies Congress with an amorphous goal,
but no explicit power by which to achieve it. In order to exercise its
Clause 8 power, Congress must confer exclusive rights utilizing the
means clause. The goal of the Framers, after all, was to enable regimes roughly analogous to our patent and copyright systems, subject
202
to the limitations of Clause 8. A reading that characterizes the subject matter of Clause 8 as the promotion of progress, rather than the
granting of exclusive rights, therefore, disregards its practical application.
If the power granted by Clause 8 is situated in the means clause,
the copyright power—stripped of its limits—authorizes Congress to
grant exclusive rights in expression. Under this reading, if another
enumerated power, prior to the expansion of the Commerce Clause,
permitted Congress to grant exclusive rights in expression in a manner inconsistent with a Clause 8 limit, that limit would serve a purely
internal and descriptive function. But to the extent granting exclusive rights in expression was the sole domain of Clause 8, its limits are
enforceable against the remainder of Congress’s enumerated powers.
Prior to the emergence of the modern Commerce Clause, no
enumerated power, other than Clause 8, vested Congress with authority to confer exclusive rights in expression. Indeed, no other enumerated powers countenanced federal grants of monopoly rights in
any subject matter. Needless to say, if no other legislative authority
reached the core subject matter of Clause 8—the granting of exclusive rights in expression—Congress lacked the power to create such
rights in a manner inconsistent with the limits of Clause 8. As such,
the limits of Clause 8 apply even when Congress acts in the name of
commerce.
Some have argued that preferential taxes enacted by Congress in
the early twentieth century functioned as exclusive rights because
203
they hampered competition and increased prices. The Motor Car204
rier Act of 1935, for example, suppressed the nascent trucking industry in favor of the incumbent railroads. Likewise, taxes on oleomargarine advantaged the dairy industry by increasing the costs of
205
butter substitutes.
By limiting inter-industry competition, the ar-

202
203
204
205

See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966); Oliar, supra note 1, at 1816–17.
Nachbar, supra note 48, at 353–54.
Motor Carrier Act, 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543.
See Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 784, § 2, 32 Stat. 193; see also McCray v. United States, 195 U.S.
27 (1904) (discussing the tax on oleomargarine and its implications).
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gument goes, these taxes imposed public costs similar to an exclusive
rights regime.
But even if some of the economic consequences were similar,
these preferential taxes were neither rights nor exclusive. First, these
taxes conferred no rights. Instead, they increased the cost of doing
business for disfavored industries by direct taxation. Neither the railroad industry nor the dairy industry received a legally enforceable
right against their competitors or the public as a result of these taxes.
Whatever benefit they indirectly received inured to the favored industry as a whole, rather than any single person or entity. Nor did that
benefit permit the favored industries to exclude new competitors
within the untaxed industry. A tax that applies to an entire industry
and confers no right to exclude is plainly not equivalent to an exclu206
sive right.
Even assuming other enumerated powers could be construed to
enable grants of exclusive rights, none address the granting of such
rights in expression—the core subject matter of the copyright power.
Because no enumerated powers offered Congress authority that was
inconsistent with the limits of Clause 8, those limits apply externally
to constrain any congressional action that attempts to invade the subject matter of Clause 8. Part IV addresses legislation, both enacted
and proposed, that attempts to regulate the subject matter of Clause
8 in a manner inconsistent with its limits.
IV. ENFORCING CLAUSE 8 LIMITS
If Clause 8 limits apply externally, Congress faces two broad
classes of constraints when it seeks to grant exclusive rights in expression. First, Congress must respect limits on the sorts of rights it con206

Although not a tax, the Manufacturing Clause of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 601
(2000), functioned in much the same way. Prior to 1986, § 601 prohibited the importation of “nondramatic literary material that is in the English language . . . unless . . . such
material . . . [was] manufactured in the United States or Canada.” Id. § 601(a) In Author’s League of America, Inc. v. Oman, the Second Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to the Manufacturing Clause. 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986). The court held that the
statute, regardless of whether it promoted the progress of science, was justified under the
Commerce Clause. The Author’s League court implicitly recognized that the Manufacturing Clause was beyond the scope of Clause 8 subject matter. Section 601 did not grant
exclusive rights in expression. Instead, it regulated the importation of goods manufactured abroad on an industry-wide basis. Both the court and Congress understood that
the Manufacturing Clause “protect[ed] . . . the domestic printing industry.” Id. at 224. It
granted no exclusive rights to particular copyright holders. Much like the preferential
taxes, § 601 effected a regulation, not an exclusive rights regime. Despite its codification
in Title 17, the Manufacturing Clause was a commerce regulation from the outset.
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fers; those rights must promote progress, expire in time, and vest in
authors. Second, Congress must adhere to limits on the types of
works protected by exclusive rights; those works must be both original
and written. Taken together, these limits contribute to a constitutionally grounded public domain.
This Part applies both of these classes of Clause 8 limits to analyze
the constitutionality of existing and proposed legislation. After considering each class of limits in turn, this Part returns to the question
that motivated this discussion of inter-clause conflict—the constitutionality of the federal anti-bootlegging statutes. After analyzing
those statutes through the lens of external Clause 8 limits, this Part
concludes by evaluating the Second Circuit’s effort to resolve this inter-clause conflict in Martignon.
A. Limits on the Scope and Character of Exclusive Rights
Three Clause 8 limits restrain the nature of the exclusive rights
Congress may grant. Exclusive rights in expressive works must offer
protection for only limited times, and that protection must be
granted to authors. In addition, Congress has an independent obligation to ensure that grants of exclusive rights in expression “promote the Progress of Science.” Legislation that fails to conform to
these limits, regardless of the power under which Congress claims to
be acting, exceeds its constitutional authority.
The requirement that exclusive rights in expression promote the
progress of science poses the greatest practical difficulty in enforcement. Again, the dominant reading interprets this text as a preamble
with no binding effect. But even if courts reject this view in favor of
the more supportable position that “promote the Progress” functions
207
as a genuine limit on congressional authority, the precise contours
of its mandate are not self-evident. Determining whether legislation
promotes the advancement of learning requires a forward-looking
analysis of an act’s likely effects that is inherently speculative. Perhaps in recognition of the rather indeterminate nature of the command to “promote the Progress,” courts—even those that accept that
208
“promote the Progress” functions as a limit —have typically yielded
to congressional judgment on the question of furthering the constitu-

207
208

See Oliar, supra note 1, at 1810–15.
See, e.g., Figueroa v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 150 (2005) (applying rational basis test
to determine whether congressional diversion of patent fees for non-patent purposes was
a valid measure aimed to “promote the Progress”).
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209

tional goals of Clause 8. As a result, no clear metric for evaluating
210
the promotion of progress has emerged.
Given the inherent imprecision of the inquiry and the Court’s resulting deference, robust
enforcement of this limit is unlikely. However, this limit could prove
important in precluding Congress from indulging its more extreme
impulses.
Unlike “promote the Progress,” the limited times requirement has
a clearly defined outer boundary. As the Court acknowledged in Eldred, if the limited times requirement is to have any meaning, it must
at the very least prevent Congress from enacting a perpetual term of
211
copyright protection.
This limited term of protection is meant to
ensure that copyrighted works eventually enter the public domain,
212
where they can be freely copied, distributed, and adapted.
But if
“limited” simply means “not infinite,” the Constitution may not impose any practical limit on the term of copyright protection. A life
plus 10,000-year copyright term, while not perpetual, would imperil
rather than secure the public domain. A reading of Clause 8 that
permitted a term of such length would render “limited Times” nearly
as meaningless as an interpretation that ignored it altogether.

209

210

211

212

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (“[I]t is generally for Congress, not the
courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“Th[e] evolution of the duration of copyright protection
tellingly illustrates the difficulties Congress faces . . . . [I]t is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.”); Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress
may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy
which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.”).
Some early cases held that immoral or obscene works could not be protected under
copyright on the basis that such works did not promote progress. See generally, e.g., Barnes
v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1903); Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal.
1867). Although subsequent courts have not followed this practice, see Mitchell Bros.
Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to deny
copyright protection to material on the basis of alleged obscenity), these early cases suggest that courts can define and enforce limits on the basis of “promote the Progress.”
Professor Oliar has suggested as a starting point criterion that deems legislation unconstitutional if “its marginal benefits, in terms of creativity and knowledge, are extremely outweighed by its marginal costs in terms of creativity and knowledge.” Oliar, supra note 1,
at 1840.
537 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The express grant of a perpetual copyright
would unquestionably violate the textual requirement that the authors’ exclusive rights
be only ‘for limited Times.’”).
See Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 374.
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But even accepting Eldred’s anemic reading of “limited times,” this
requirement still places some meaningful constraints on Congress.
External application of the durational limit means that Congress, by
announcing its reliance on the Commerce Clause or by phrasing legislation in a manner suggestive of a commercial regulation, cannot
avoid adherence to the limited times requirement. As even the
staunchest supporters of term extension have realized, the limited
times requirement imposes a limit that is not so easily circum213
vented. Although it would appear that Congress could easily comply with the requirement that exclusive rights in expression last for
some period short of eternity, as discussed infra, existing federal stat214
utes fail to satisfy even that forgiving standard.
In addition to containing a durational limit, exclusive rights
granted by Congress in expressive works must be granted to the authors of those works. Whether Congress seeks to amend the Copyright Act, regulate commerce, or create sui generis intellectual property protection, only authors are appropriate recipients of exclusive
rights in expression.
Of course, Clause 8 permits exclusive rights to fall into the hands
of non-authors after they vest. Authors remain free to transfer their
215
rights to non-authors, and prior copyright acts allowed parties other
than authors to renew existing copyrights in the event of the author’s
216
death.
In both of these instances, however, authors are the initial
recipients of exclusive rights. Under the current Act, copyrights can

213

214
215
216

Congresswoman Mary Bono stated, with reference to her late husband, Rep. Sonny Bono:
Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever. I am informed by
staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. . . . As you know, there is
also Jack Valenti’s proposal for term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the
Committee may look at that next Congress.
144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bono).
See infra Part IV.C.
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000).
Under all pre-1976 U.S. copyright acts, at the expiration of the original copyright term,
the copyright holder could renew the copyright. See R. Anthony Reese, Is the Public Domain Permanent?: Congress’s Power To Grant Exclusive Rights in Unpublished Public Domain
Works, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 531, 558 (2007). As early as 1831, if the original copyright
holder was deceased, the author’s spouse or children could exercise the renewal option.
See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 34, 16 Stat.
198, 202. Subsequent acts permitted renewal by the beneficiaries of the author’s estate.
The 1909 Act provided that if the author left no surviving spouse or child, the renewal
term could vest in the author’s executor or next of kin. See Copyright Act of 1909, Act of
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080. This same rule applied to works published before 1978 under the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2000).
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217

be transferred, but initially vest in the author. And renewal terms
granted to spouses and executors under pre-1976 regimes were contingent on the initial copyright grants to authors and functioned as
218
extensions of those preexisting rights.
The work-made-for-hire doctrine may likewise raise questions related to the vesting of copyrights in non-authors. Copyright interests
in works made for hire may vest in individuals and corporations who
fall outside of our intuitive and perhaps romantic notions of authorship. But copyright law recognizes that the term “author” should not
be rigidly interpreted so as to exclude those who commission or direct the creation of works of expression made for hire, since they can
reasonably be considered the originator of those works. An author,
whether an individual or a corporation, need not lay pen to paper to
create a work. One who oversees and directs the creation of a work
219
can claim responsibility for its creation and can serve as its author.
But if the term “author” is to remain meaningful, it must contain
some limits. Two grants of exclusive rights, one already implemented
in the European Union and another under discussion at the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), provide examples of
exclusive rights that likely cannot be squared with the Constitution’s
insistence that exclusive rights in expression extend only to the originators or creators of that expression.
The 1993 European Union Copyright Directive (“Directive”) provides for the granting of exclusive rights to the publishers of previ220
ously unpublished public domain works.
Under legislation em-

217

218

219
220

See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). Perhaps more problematically, the original copyright term
did not always vest in the author herself, but could instead initially vest in the author’s assignee. Under pre-1976 regimes, an author could transfer her interest in a work after its
creation, but prior to its publication. Even when an assignee obtained the original copyright, the initial grant depended upon a right that originated with the author and was exercised only by one who stood in the author’s shoes as a result of the author’s decision to
transfer that right.
That extension, however, was unburdened by the assignments and licenses granted during the original term, leading some courts to refer to the renewal term as a “new estate.”
Reese, supra note 217, at 558; see also G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189
F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951) (“A copyright renewal creates a new estate, and the few cases
which have dealt with the subject assert that the new estate is clear of all rights, interests
or licenses granted under the original copyright.”). Nonetheless, a preexisting grant of
rights to the author was a necessary condition for the existence of the renewal term.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “work made for hire”).
Council Directive 93/98, art. 4, 1919 O.J. (L 290) 9, 11 (EC) (“Any person who, after the
expiry of copyright protection, for the first time lawfully publishes or lawfully communicates to the public a previously unpublished work, shall benefit from a protection equivalent to the economic rights of the author. The term of protection of such rights shall be
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bodying the Directive, the first publisher to make a previously unpublished public domain work available receives exclusive rights in that
221
work for twenty-five years. Assuming Congress sought to enact similar legislation, it would be barred by the limits of Clause 8.
Unlike a corporation that directs the creation of a work made for
hire, a publisher who merely prints and distributes a long-extant un222
The
published work is not the creator or originator of that work.
EU publication right confers a right equivalent to a copyright on a
party with no necessary connection to the author, aside from possession of a manuscript. Whereas copyright renewals were granted to
the author’s spouse or executor, the publication rights envisioned by
the Directive provide exclusive rights to rank strangers from the author’s perspective. While transfers and renewals under prior U.S. law
can be read as consistent with the Constitution’s call for copyrights
granted to authors, the copyright grave robbing permitted under the
EU Directive cannot be squared with our Constitution.
The most recent draft of the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of
Broadcasting Organizations (“Broadcast Treaty”) offers another example of potential legislation that, if adopted by Congress, would
223
likely violate the limits of Clause 8. The Broadcast Treaty would extend to broadcasters and cablecasters a host of exclusive rights in
their transmissions—rights of fixation, reproduction, distribution, re224
transmission, and communication to the public.
Although broadcasters originate the signal that carries the content they transmit, they
are often not its authors. But these rights are granted to broadcasters

221

222

223

224

25 years from the time when the work was first lawfully published or lawfully communicated to the public.”).
See, e.g., Copyright and Related Rights Regulations, 1996, S.I. 1996/2967, pt. II, ¶ 16(6)
(U.K.) (granting a “publication right” for a twenty-five year duration to first publishers
under United Kingdom law).
Indeed, since the Framers were likely influenced by the Statute of Anne in crafting the
contours of copyright in the United States, and the Statute of Anne was itself a rejection
of the Stationers’ monopoly, reading “Authors” to include the publishers of existing unpublished works appears particularly inappropriate. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 6 at
1144-45 (noting the likely influence of the Statute of Anne and the Stationers’ Monopoly
on the Framers).
For a discussion of other ways in which the Broadcast Treaty may violate the Constitution,
see generally Adam R. Tarosky, The Constitutionality of WIPO’s Broadcasting Treaty: The Originality and Limited Times Requirements of the Copyright Clause, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16.
See generally World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on Copyright
and Related Rights, Revised Draft Basic Proposal for the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations, SCCR/15/2 (July 31, 2006), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
sccr/en/sccr_15/sccr_15_2.pdf.
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regardless of their roles in creating the transmitted content, permitting exclusive rights in material created by others and, in some cases,
226
not even protected by copyright.
As a result, legislation creating
227
the rights envisioned by the Broadcast Treaty would extend exclusive rights in expression to non-authors in violation of the limits of
228
Clause 8.
Clause 8 imposes three different restrictions on the rights Congress can grant in expression. Those limits restrain the purpose and
effect of exclusive rights, the duration of those rights, and to whom
they can be extended. The next Section describes how Clause 8 limits restrict the class of works that can be subject to such grants of exclusive rights.

225

226

227

228

Broadcasters could argue that the licensed transmission of television programming interspersed with advertisements results in an independently copyrightable compilation or derivative work entitling them to protection. But to the extent that such a work was both
fixed and original, it would require no new legislation and would be protected by existing
copyright law in the United States.
See, e.g., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, BRIEFING PAPER ON THE PROPOSED WIPO
BROADCASTING TREATY 2 (June 18, 2007), http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/
broadcasting_treaty/EFF_wipo_briefing_paper_062007.pdf (noting the potential impact
of the Broadcast Treaty on public domain works).
The treaty power offers another potential alternative source of authority for the regulation of exclusive rights in expressive works in a manner inconsistent within the limits of
Clause 8. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter) Nationalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355 (2007). Some argue
that the treaty power is unrestrained by the limits of Clause 8. See Caroline T. Nguyen,
Note, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time? Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations
Through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079 (2006). A full treatment of potential
conflicts with the treaty power is beyond the scope of this Article. But it is worth noting
that the limits of Clause 8 are equally superfluous whether they are ignored under the
Commerce Clause or the treaty power. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (Black, J.,
plurality opinion) (“[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution.”).
Under current U.S. law, a broadcaster who is licensed to transmit a copyrighted work may
file a copyright infringement suit against a cable or satellite provider that rebroadcasts
that work without paying the statutory license for such a rebroadcast. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 111(b) (2000) (detailing the situations under which secondary transmissions may be actionable as infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501); see also id. § 501(c) (allowing broadcast
stations to be treated as beneficial owners, even when a cable system rebroadcasts a particular work in the same local service area). Unlike under the Broadcast Treaty, the right
at issue, while asserted by the licensee, is a copyright granted to the author. These provisions do not enlarge the scope of the copyright grant, but merely permit the broadcaster
to stand in the shoes of the copyright holder as a procedural matter.
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B. Limits on Protectable Works
The limits of Clause 8 deny Congress the power to grant exclusive
rights in two types of expressive works: those that are unoriginal and
those that are unwritten. These two classes of works are not only unprotectable under the Copyright Act and any revisions to it, but they
are also beyond the scope of any other grant of legislative authority.
Only expressive works that are both original and written are the
proper subjects of federal grants of exclusive rights. Taken together,
the originality and writings requirements establish a class of works
that lies outside the positive authority of Clause 8, but within its exclusive domain and thus beyond the reach of other enumerated powers.
Originality, the central limit on the scope of copyrightable subject
matter, has been described as the “sine qua non” of the copyright
229
230
grant, the “premise of copyright law,” and “the core question of
231
As the Court has recognized, although the threcopyrightability.”
sholds for originality under both the Constitution and the Copyright
Act are minimal, those works that fail to satisfy it are ineligible for
232
protection.
After Feist rejected the notion that unoriginal compilations of data
are within the scope of the copyright power, legislators have repeatedly sought to provide protection for such works through other
233
means. Proponents of such legislation appear to believe that by re229
230
231
232
233

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003).
See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
See, e.g., H.R. 3872, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2003) (prohibiting the misappropriation of databases); H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2003) (prohibiting the misappropriation of
certain databases); H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) (prohibiting the distribution
of database duplicates); H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) (prohibiting the misappropriation of collections of information); S. 2291, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998) (same).
These efforts have faced sustained criticism. See generally Benkler, supra note 1; Heald &
Sherry, supra note 6, at 1176–79 (analyzing the constitutionality of regulating exchanges
of information); Patry, supra note 6 at 394–97 (criticizing the Collections of Information
Antipiracy Act); Memorandum from William M. Treanor, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to the Associate White House
Counsel, Constitutional Concerns Raised by the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (July 28,
1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/righto.htm (noting that legislation granting
exclusive rights to unoriginal data “would impermissibly infringe on an implicit limitation
contained in the Intellectual Property Clause”). For other commentary on the relationship between constitutional interpretation of Congress’s enumerated powers and intellectual property legislation, see generally Paul Bender, The Constitutionality of Proposed Federal
Database Protection Legislation, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 143 (2002), Jane C. Ginsburg, No
“Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone,
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fusing to extend copyright protection to unoriginal works Feist removed those works from the domain of Clause 8 entirely, leaving
them free to be regulated under the less restrictive authority of the
Commerce Clause. But far from freeing Congress from the constraints of the copyright power, the Court’s holding in Feist—coupled
with the understanding of Clause 8 limits as external constraints on
congressional authority generally—dictates that unoriginal compilations of data are simply not the proper subject of federal grants of ex234
clusive rights.
The Constitution mandates that, regardless of the
will of Congress, unoriginal expressive works are permanently and
235
inescapably within the public domain.

92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992), and Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright Protection of Databases Can Be Constitutional, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159 (2002).
234

As a consequence of the public’s “negative right” to use unoriginal works, Professor Patry
likewise concludes that Congress may not, through the exercise of the commerce power,
grant exclusive rights in unoriginal compilations of data. See Patry, supra note 6, at 394–
97. This conclusion is justified, as far as it goes. But while Patry’s negative right preserves
the originality requirement in the face of the expanded commerce power, it fails to do
the same for the writings requirement.

235

Trademark protection, which the Court rejected as an improper exercise of Clause 8 authority, finds justification in Congress’s commerce power. See generally Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82 (1879) (invalidating statutes which authorized the indictment of persons who
counterfeited trademarked material). Although the Lanham Act extends protection to
marks regardless of their originality, the constitutionality of its prohibitions against infringement, false designation, and false description is not in doubt. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114
& 1125(a) (2000). Traditional trademark protection functions to identify the source or
origin of products in the marketplace in order to enable consumers to make informed
decisions. As the Court has recognized, trademark law is concerned with identifying the
source of a physical product, not the author of any expressive content that product might
contain. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32
(2003) (“[A]s used in the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is in our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that
‘goods’ embody or contain.”). In order to avoid conflicts with the exclusive subject matter of copyright law, the Court has recognized that trademark protection cannot extend
to the communicative or expressive aspects of goods and services. See id. at 33; see also
Christopher Sprigman, Indirect Enforcement of the Intellectual Property Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 565, 585 (2007) (characterizing Dastar as an indirect external application of
Clause 8 limits). Although a trademark can identify the manufacturer of a videotape, the
mark does not necessarily indicate the author of the “intellectual content that it conveys.”
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33. For the purposes of trademark law, a mark functions as an indicator of source, even if the mark itself is separately eligible for copyright or patent protection. Because the communicative aspects of works remain within the sole province of
Clause 8, federal trademark law can be regulated under the Commerce Clause. Although
beyond the scope of this Article, trademark dilution, because it grants exclusive rights in
unoriginal works not tethered to source indication, raises more difficult constitutional
questions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (providing remedies for dilution of famous
marks in the absence of consumer confusion, false designation, or false description).
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Just as unprotectable unoriginal works are within Clause 8’s exclusive zone of control, unwritten works also fall within the ambit of
Clause 8 but outside of its positive authority. Because Congress is
236
permitted to grant exclusive rights only in writings, unwritten expressive works fall into a no-man’s land of federal grants of exclusive
rights; they cannot receive protection pursuant to Clause 8, but are
237
simultaneously beyond the reach of other enumerated powers.
An unwritten work of expression is not so fundamentally divorced
from the subject matter of Clause 8 to justify immunity from its limits.
Unwritten works are no farther from the core concerns of the copyright power than unoriginal compilations of data. Indeed, to the extent unwritten works exhibit originality, the key characteristic of copyrightability, they are closer to copyright’s central concerns. Both
originality and writings are limits on the positive authority granted to
Congress under Clause 8 and can lay equal claim to external application. If the basis for external application of these limits is the risk of
superfluity, there is no reason to treat one as an enforceable limit on
congressional power, while viewing Congress’s violation of the other
as permission to escape the restrictions imposed by Clause 8.
Admittedly, the policy rationale for denying Congress the ability
to grant exclusive rights in unwritten works may not be as immediately apparent as the concerns that militate against protections for
unoriginal compilations of data. Opposition to protection for data is
rooted in the threat to the free flow of information posed by monop238
oly rights in facts.
The harm that would flow from protection for
unwritten works is perhaps less vividly imagined, in part because
there have been fewer occasions to consider it.
Unwritten works could take at least two forms—ideas, on the one
hand, and performances and utterances, on the other. The term
“ideas,” in this context, does not refer to the abstractions or conceptual generalities referred to by the idea/expression distinction. In236
237

238

See supra Part III.A.4.
The limits of Clause 8 apply to limit the power of the federal government; they do not, on
their own, preclude the states from enacting copyright-like protections against the unauthorized recording of live performances. More than twenty states provide such protection. See Keith V. Lee, Resolving the Dissonant Constitutional Chords Inherent in the Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute in United States v. Moghadam, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 327, 332
n.29 (2000) (collecting statutes). States could likewise make use of the right of publicity
to protect performers from unauthorized commercial exploitation of live performances.
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that there
was no constitutional bar to a state law requiring compensation to a performer for an unauthorized broadcast of his performance).
See Benkler, supra note 6, at 558–69.
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stead, “ideas” here refers to an author’s internal, unvoiced, and unwritten conceptions. These ideas may be general in nature, or they
may be so detailed that, if embodied in some tangible form, they
would qualify as copyrightable expression. But even those creations
lack the permanence necessary for copyright protection if they are
not reduced to a tangible medium. Likewise, a performance or utterance, even if voiced publicly, fails to satisfy the writings requirement unless embodied in some nonfleeting form.
The refusal to extend copyright protection to these unwritten
works serves two related functions. The first is evidentiary. By requiring that any work protected by copyright be committed to tangible
form, the Constitution avoids problems of proof that would otherwise
239
stymie enforcement efforts.
If unwritten works were protected,
“copyright law would forever be mired in disputes over the definition
240
and boundaries of the works claiming copyright protection.” Every
successful film or novel could face claims that it infringed upon exclusive rights in unwritten works, the precise content of which would
be known only to few, if any, aside from their authors. These problems of proof and the resulting uncertainty could create unreasonable risks that would deter investment in creative works.
Second, the writings requirement helps to ensure that the copyright system remains faithful to its constitutional directive. Extending
protection only to written works encourages authors to put their
ideas on paper, where they can best be preserved, copied, and eventually disseminated to the public. To the extent the writings requirement ensures that expressive works are captured in lasting reproducible forms, that requirement furthers the goals of enriching
the public domain and promoting progress. Granting protection to
unwritten works could undermine those aims. With lessened incen241
tives to fix their works, some authors may deny posterity their value.
Relatedly, grants of exclusive rights in unwritten works could interfere with public discussion and the exchange of information. If
239
240

241

See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 730–34 (2003)
(discussing the fixation requirement as a rule of evidence).
Gregory S. Donat, Note, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with Teeth for Improvisational Performers,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1400 (1997); see also Lichtman, supra note 240, at 730–34; Russ
VerSteeg, Jurimetric Copyright: Future Shock for the Visual Arts, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
125, 132 (1994) (discussing the practical problems that the writings requirement addresses).
See, e.g., Joseph C. Merschman, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the
Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661,
681 (2002) (noting that the fixation requirement is critical to the bargain between society
and copyright holders).
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copyright extended to unfixed expression, “every utterance” could be
242
protected.
Retelling an anecdote overheard in the neighborhood
bar or taking notes on a debate at city hall could give rise to claims of
infringement. Copyright protection for unwritten works could transform every public statement or private conversation into a potentially
protectable work. Without a written record of the particular expression at issue, the effect of such protection on public discourse could
be dramatic.
The Framers, it seems, were justified in limiting the scope of copyrightable subject matter to original writings. Permitting Congress to
draft legislation that grants exclusive rights in works of expression
that fall within the penumbral public domain would give rise to outcomes antithetical to the stated purpose of Clause 8. Nonetheless, at
least one existing piece of federal legislation grants exclusive rights in
unwritten expression, and does so without a durational limit.
C. The Unconstitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
The civil anti-bootlegging statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1101, treats as a
copyright infringer any person who “without the consent of the performer” fixes the sounds of a live musical performance or reproduces, transmits, distributes, sells, rents, or otherwise traffics in such a
243
recording.
Likewise, its counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, imposes
criminal sanctions of up to ten years of imprisonment on those who
engage in that proscribed conduct “knowingly and for purposes of
244
commercial advantage or private financial gain.”
As a matter of policy, Congress’s wisdom in enacting these statutes
is doubtful. Although they impose the penalties for copyright infringement, the anti-bootlegging statutes do not incorporate speech245
protective defenses to infringement, including fair use.
But more
242

243

244
245

Falwell v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (W.D. Va. 1981) (rejecting a
claim to common-law copyright protection for spoken expression); see also Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1382 (1989) (discussing the role of the fixation
requirement in defining the bounds of the protected expression).
17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000). To refer to such recordings as “fixed” is incorrect. Under
the definition of “fixed” provided by the Copyright Act, a work is fixed only if embodied
in a tangible medium of expression “by or under the authority of the author.” Id. § 101.
By definition, these recordings, even though sufficiently tangible, are not made with the
authority of the author, unless of course, the recordist is considered the author. As that
was clearly not the intention of Congress, the use of this term is mistaken.
18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000).
The First Amendment presents an independent basis for finding the anti-bootlegging
statutes unconstitutional. To the extent the statutes are copyright laws, they alter the tra-
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fundamentally, these statutes violate the external limits of Clause 8 by
conferring perpetual rights to unprotectable works.
In order for the anti-bootlegging statutes to fall within the exclusive scope of Clause 8, they must confer exclusive rights in expression. The subject matter regulated by these statutes, live musical performances and recordings thereof, can safely be assumed to be
expressive. Indeed, most, if not all, would satisfy the originality requirement of Clause 8. But do the statutes confer exclusive rights?
This question is perhaps best answered by comparing the rights
effectively created by the anti-bootlegging statutes to those granted by
the Copyright Act. In part, § 106 confers to copyright holders exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, sell, rent, and publicly perform
246
their works. Under the copyright grant, only the copyright holder
is permitted to engage in these activities or to authorize others to do
247
so. One who undertakes any of these activities without the permission of the copyright holder, absent some applicable defense, is an
infringer.
Liability under the anti-bootlegging statutes is likewise premised
248
on taking action “without the consent of the performer.” Those actions—in addition to recording a live performance—include repro249
ducing, distributing, selling, renting, and transmitting.
By imposing civil and criminal liability on one who takes such action without
the authorization of the performer, the anti-bootlegging statutes create exclusive rights remarkably similar to those granted by § 106.

246
247
248
249

ditional contours of copyright’s internal speech-protective safeguards, including fair use,
and are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20
(2003) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”
(quoting 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000) (first alteration in original)); see also Golan v. Gonzales,
501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007) (remanding a challenge to § 514 of the URAA for
analysis under the First Amendment). To the extent they are commerce legislation, the
anti-bootlegging statutes are subject to traditional First Amendment analysis. As argued
by amici in Martignon, the statutes are both overbroad and vague. See Brief for TwentyNine Intellectual Property and Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant-Appellee at 24–30, United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007)
(No. 04-5649) (asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 2319A merits heightened First Amendment
scrutiny). In Martignon, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
consider the First Amendment challenge. See Martignon, 492 F.3d at 153.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
See id. (granting “exclusive rights . . . to do and to authorize” various activities); id. § 501
(defining copyright infringement and remedies).
17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000) (defining unauthorized acts as occurring “without the consent of the performer or performers involved”); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000).
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If the anti-bootlegging statutes fall within the scope of Clause 8 by
virtue of granting exclusive rights in expression, are the statutes
proper exercises of Clause 8 authority or instead located within the
penumbra defined by its limits? The first exclusive right granted to
performers under the anti-bootlegging statutes is the right to record
a live performance, or to authorize others to do so. The object of this
right to initially record a performance—because it necessarily precedes the creation of the recording—is the live performance itself.
But since these live performances are ephemeral, they cannot satisfy
the writings requirement of Clause 8.
Courts and Congress have construed the term “Writings” liber250
ally. In order to account for the inevitability of new methods of reducing the creativity of authors to tangible form, the Court has
adopted a broad and flexible understanding of the term that embraces “any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellec251
tual . . . labor.” But no court has broadened the definition of “Writings” to include works not embodied in some tangible form. And
Congress has never extended the scope of copyrightable works to include unfixed ephemeral performances. Any reading of the term
“Writings” that embraces live performances—as opposed to re252
cordings of them—cannot be squared with precedent.
To do so
would strip “Writings” of any meaning by eliminating its sole established limit. Since the live performances protected by the antibootlegging statutes are not writings, they cannot be the proper subject of federal grants of exclusive rights, and the exclusive right to record is unconstitutional.
Aside from conferring exclusive rights in unwritten live performances, the anti-bootlegging statutes also provide performers with perpetual exclusive rights over recordings of those performances—
recordings that qualify as original, written expression well within the
exclusive province of Clause 8. Because these rights are perpetual,
the statutes run afoul of the limited times requirement of Clause 8.
Both statutes grant performers the exclusive right to authorize the
“reproduc[tion of] copies or phonorecords . . . from an unauthorized

250
251
252

See supra Part III.A.4.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
See David Nimmer, Essay, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1409 (1995) (“[N]o
respectable interpretation of the word ‘Writings’ embraces an untaped performance of
someone singing at Carnegie Hall.”). But see 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON
COPYRIGHT § 15.6.1 (2d ed. 2005)(“[P]erformances subject to [federal anti-bootlegging]
protection are ‘writings’ in the constitutional sense . . . .”).
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253

fixation.” Likewise, both grant the performer the exclusive right to
authorize distribution and sale of “any copy or phonorecord” of an
254
unauthorized recording.
These copies, as the “physical rendering[s] of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor,” qualify
255
as writings under Clause 8.
Because recordings of performances
256
are within the reach of Clause 8, they are likewise subject to its limits, regardless of the power under which Congress claims to act.
The recordings of musical performances protected from unauthorized reproduction under the anti-bootlegging statute differ in
only one respect from those protected under traditional copyright
law. Copyrighted sound recordings are initially created with the performer’s authorization; those subject to the perpetual exclusive rights
granted by the anti-bootlegging statute are recorded without authorization. This distinction could prove decisive for a number of questions under a constitutionally legitimate statutory regime. It could
determine whether a copyright subsists in a work, who may claim it,
or whether an infringement has occurred. But this distinction does
not establish a line that divides legislation enacted pursuant to Clause
8 and constrained by its limits from legislation justified under the
Commerce Clause and thereby immune from those limits.
Congress may well be capable of crafting legislation that confers
257
to performers exclusive rights in recordings of their performances,
253
254
255

256
257

17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(1).
17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(3).
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561; see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d
657, 664 (2d. Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting) (asserting that a writing is a “physical object that can be made to reproduce”).
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562.
The durational problem raised by the anti-bootlegging statutes could be resolved fairly
easily by inserting a time limit on the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, and transmit unauthorized recordings of live performances. TRIPS, in fact, required only fifty
years of protection. See supra note 10.
The more difficult issue in attempting to provide constitutionally authorized protections for live performances is that those performances themselves are not an appropriate
subject of exclusive rights under Clause 8. A recording of a performance can be protected, but not the performance itself. One potential solution is to expand the Copyright
Act’s simultaneous fixation provision to include untransmitted live performances that are
fixed under the authority of the performer at the time of the performance. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (“A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is ‘fixed’
for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission.”). Under this approach, an unauthorized recording of a simultaneously
fixed live performance would be an infringement under traditional copyright doctrine in
much the same way a recording of a televised live sports event is today. See, e.g., Posting of
Fred von Lohmann to The Patry Copyright Blog, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005
/05/constitutionality-of-bootleg-statute.html (May 18, 2005, 13:29 EST) (“In considering
the issue of bootlegging . . . I’ve always wondered why Congress didn’t simply extend the
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but it must do so within the confines of Clause 8. But because the
Constitution “clearly precludes” perpetual grants of exclusive rights
258
in copyrightable subject matter, the failure to include a durational
limit in the anti-bootlegging statute—to the extent the objects of its
exclusive rights are writings—proves its fatal flaw.
D. The Second Circuit’s Misreading of § 2319A
The district court in Martignon recognized the dual constitutional
infirmities of the anti-bootlegging statute; it granted perpetual rights,
259
and it granted those rights in unwritten performances.
On appeal, the United States agreed that § 2319A conferred rights
in non-writings, but it argued that by doing so, the statute essentially
removed itself from the sphere of Clause 8 power and into legislative
terrain governed by the commerce power. Martignon and his supporters, on the other hand, maintained that by protecting unwritten
works, § 2319A did not escape the limits of Clause 8, but simply violated them. The significance of protection for non-writings looked to
be the determinative issue on appeal. But when the Second Circuit
issued its opinion, some two years after it heard the case, it ignored
this central question. Instead, the court held that because § 2319A is

258

259

‘simultaneous fixation’ doctrine, 17 U.S.C. 101 ([definition] of ‘fixed’), so that performers who wanted full copyright protections against bootleggers could simply record their
performances. Why not eliminate the ‘transmit’ requirement from the ‘simultaneous fixation’ definition, and delete the strange ‘prior notice’ requirements of 17 U.S.C. 411(b)?
Then performers would get the full arsenal of copyright remedies for the full copyright
term against any bootleggers, simply by recording their performances on a handheld recorder.”). But this approach, much like the anti-bootlegging statutes, impermissibly extends exclusive rights to a performance that is not a writing. The simultaneous fixation
approach at least does so by creating the legal fiction that the performance is fixed, but it
nonetheless confers rights in a nonwriting.
A better approach would deem live performers the holders of a copyright in any unauthorized recording of their performances. Once the recording has been made, performers could assert the typical panoply of § 106 rights against infringers. They could
not, however, prevent the initial creation of the recording. But to the extent this is
viewed as a shortcoming, it is one rooted in limits imposed by the Constitution. This approach would require a change to the statutory definition of “fixed” works. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 n.16 (2003) (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-315, at 11 (2d
Sess. 1996)); accord Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37
(2003) (noting that Congress may not create “a species of perpetual . . . copyright”).
See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text.
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not a copyright law, the limits of Clause 8 were irrelevant to the ques260
tion of its constitutionality.
In many respects, the Second Circuit’s analysis in Martignon serves
as a model for courts facing inter-clause conflicts. After considering
the relevant Supreme Court precedent, the court recognized that
some limits on enumerated powers do constrain Congress when it
seeks to act pursuant to an independent grant of authority. The
court rightly understood that those limits apply whenever the legislation in question is an exercise of power over the core subject matter
of that grant. According to the court, Commerce Clause legislation
transgresses the limits of Clause 8 if “(1) the law [Congress] enacts is
an exercise of the power granted Congress by the Copyright Clause
and (2) the resulting law violates one or more specific limits of the
261
Copyright Clause.”
The next step in the Second Circuit’s analysis was to determine
“whether Section 2319A is a copyright law in the sense that RITA was
262
a bankruptcy law.” If so, § 2319A, falls within the purview of Clause
8 and is bound by its limits. In the court’s words, “in order to demonstrate unconstitutionality, Martignon must establish that Section
263
2319A is a copyright law and not just that it is copyright-like.”
But the Second Circuit fundamentally misunderstood the district
court’s use of the term “copyright-like.” That term has drawn unwar264
ranted criticism from commentators as well. Although undoubtedly
imprecise and perhaps unartful, the court’s use of the term “copyright-like” roughly equates to the notion of the Clause 8 penumbra
described above. In asking whether § 2319A served as a copyright law
or a commercial regulation, the district court asked, in essence,
whether the limits of Clause 8 govern Congress’s power to enact the
statute. By classifying § 2319A as copyright-like rather than a copyright law, the court recognized that § 2319A fell within the reach of
Clause 8 limits, but outside of its positive authority. As used by the
260
261
262
263
264

See United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.
See Symposium, Panel III: United States v. Martignon—Case in Controversy, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1223, 1234 (statement of William Patry) (“The idea that
[§ 2319A] could be ‘copyright-like’ I don’t quite get either. You are pregnant or you are
not pregnant. Either it is a Copyright Clause or it is not a Copyright Clause. It can’t be
‘copyright-like.’”). But see Patry, supra note 6, at 367 n.50 (“By ‘copyright-like,’ I mean a
property right to prevent acts equivalent to those granted under the Copyright Act, such
as the right to prevent an unlicensed reproduction of a substantial portion of an unoriginal database.”).
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district court, “copyright-like” referred to statutes that—while impermissible under Clause 8—are nonetheless within the scope of its
exclusive control.
Aside from this semantic confusion, the Second Circuit rightly distilled the essence of Congress’s Clause 8 authority. Relying on the
term “secure” in Clause 8, the court suggested that copyright laws, as
their defining characteristic, “create, bestow, or allocate property
265
rights in expression.”
This definition of the core function of the
266
copyright power closely resembles the explanation offered above.
According to the Second Circuit, the limits of Clause 8 preclude
Congress from acting under the Commerce Clause any time it would
confer exclusive rights in expression in a manner inconsistent with
Clause 8 limits. This holding, taken in isolation, is a victory for proponents of external application of Clause 8 limits.
Had the Second Circuit faithfully applied this test to § 2319A, it
would have concluded that the statute was, indeed, a copyright law—
and an unconstitutional one at that. Instead, the court offered three
rationales that it believed distinguished § 2319A from true copyright
laws. None of these rationales provide a reasonable basis for the
court’s conclusion that § 2319A does not “allocate property rights in
267
expression.”
First, the court reasoned that because § 2319A imposes a criminal
sanction, it does not function to bestow exclusive rights on perform268
ers. According to the court, much like the law of criminal trespass,
269
§ 2319A “does not grant the performer the right to exclude others”;
it merely “creates a power in the government to protect the interest
270
of performers from commercial predations.” The court’s reasoning
here conflated the existence or creation of a right with the mechanism by which that right is enforced. Section 2319A does, of course,
provide the government with authority to prosecute those who violate
the statute, but it simultaneously establishes a protectable interest in
the performer whose work is the subject of the statute’s prohibitions.
Whether achieved through criminal or civil sanctions, the effect of
the anti-bootlegging statutes is the same: performers and performers
alone are permitted to engage in, or permit others to engage in, the

265
266
267
268
269
270

Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152.
See supra Part III.B.
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id.
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recording of live performances and the reproduction and distribution of copies of those recordings. The fact that some state action is
required to enforce the exclusive rights conferred by § 2319A does
not distinguish them from the rights created by § 106 of the Copy271
right Act, or from common law property rights for that matter.
Aside from misunderstanding the effect of the statute, the court’s
analysis leads to two problematic results. First, since § 1101 creates a
civil cause of action, the court’s primary basis for deeming § 2319A a
commerce regulation does not apply. This suggests, rather improbably, that the two anti-bootlegging statutes, which regulate the same
material through nearly identical prohibitions, were enacted pursuant to two different grants of authority. Moreover, it raises the possibility that one is constitutional while the other is not. Such a conclusion should have led the court to reconsider its reasoning.
Second, if enforcing grants of exclusive rights through criminal
sanctions is sufficient to render a statute a non-copyright law, the
long-standing criminal copyright provisions turn out not to be copyright laws either. Criminal copyright enforcement, which has been a
272
component of the copyright code since the nineteenth century,
would owe no allegiance to Clause 8 under the Second Circuit’s reasoning. Indeed the court admitted that, under its reasoning, Congress could impose criminal sanctions for the reproduction of public
273
domain works without running afoul of the Constitution. Here the
court bordered on pronouncing its own logic a reductio ad absurdum.
The court relied on two additional justifications for its conclusion
that § 2319A does not serve as a copyright law. Both of these considerations, because they compare the statute with the current Copyright Act rather than the scope of the copyright power, fail to further
the relevant inquiry. The court noted that the Copyright Act affords
274
authors “an extensive bundle of rights.”
By contrast, according to
the court, § 2319A, provides only “one right—the right to allow the
275
fixation of his or her performance.” Aside from mischaracterizing
271

272

273
274
275

See Shelby D. Green, Specific Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property, 36 AKRON L. REV. 245,
299–300 (2003) (“‘Property’ . . . . bestows on an owner a form of sovereignty over others,
because the sovereign state stands behind the owner’s assertion of right. Individual
property rights thus depend on state power and when the state recognizes and enforces
one person’s property right, it simultaneously denies property rights in others.”).
The first criminal provision in our copyright laws was a misdemeanor penalty added in
1897 for unlawful performances and representations of copyrighted dramatic and musical compositions. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481.
See Martignon, 492 F.3d at 152 n.7.
Id. at 151.
Id.
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the statute, which provides the performer with a bundle of rights
276
nearly identical to those conferred on copyright holders, this distinction reveals little about whether § 2319A falls within the purview
of Clause 8. The current bundle of rights that constitute a copyright
277
are a matter of congressional policy-making and industry lobbying;
they are not a reflection of the constitutional scope of the copyright
power. As history demonstrates, Congress has significantly and re278
peatedly altered the rights within this bundle.
Doing so does not
alter the constitutional source of its authority.
The court similarly mistook the current Copyright Act as the
proper metric for its constitutional analysis when it suggested that
§ 2319A was not a copyright law because it did not permit the transfer
279
of the exclusive rights it confers.
Again, while it is true that the
Copyright Act does permit copyright holders to assign or transfer
280
their interests, no constitutional mandate requires such a provision.
A copyright law without an assignment provision is nonetheless a
copyright law. If Congress, in its wisdom, chose to prevent copyright
holders from transferring their rights, Clause 8 would pose no barrier.
The Second Circuit rightly understood that limits within particular enumerated powers can impose genuine external constraints on
congressional authority. It also recognized that the limits of Clause 8
apply any time Congress seeks to grant exclusive rights in expression.
But by focusing on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Copyright
Act rather than the scope of the copyright power, the court incorrectly held that § 2319A was beyond the scope of Clause 8 and its limits. In the end, the Second Circuit failed to articulate a single rea276
277

278

279
280

See supra Part IV.C.
See Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1685 (1999) (describing the
crafting of copyright legislation as a “series of contract negotiations” between interest
groups); see also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REV. 275, 314–15 (1989) (arguing that the copyright legislative process is largely determined by industry lobbying).
The Copyright Act of 1790 Act, for example, granted exclusive rights “to print, reprint,
publish, or vend.” Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. The Copyright Act of
1909 granted rights to translate, deliver, and perform. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320,
§ 1(b)–(d), 35 Stat. 1075. The Copyright Act of 1976 Act replaced these earlier rights entirely with a new set of rights, and surely did so without disturbing the constitutional
source of Congress’s authority to confer copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (securing
copyright owners the right to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform publicly, and display publicly).
See Martignon, 492 F.3d at 151.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 201–205 (2000); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1; Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
ch. 320, § 27.
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soned basis for insisting that § 2319A is not a copyright law in the
constitutional sense. Despite the Second Circuit’s attempt to salvage
the statute, there can be little doubt that § 2319A, like its civil counterpart, is a copyright law in the same way RITA was a bankruptcy law.
Since the anti-bootlegging statutes are within the exclusive purview of
Clause 8 authority, their failure to impose a durational limit and their
extension of exclusive rights in unwritten expression, under the Second Circuit’s own test, render them unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
If the limits of Clause 8 are to retain any relevance in interpreting
the scope of Congress’s legislative powers in the face of the modern
Commerce Clause, those limits must be applied externally to preclude legislation that invades the penumbral public domain. To permit Congress to grant exclusive rights in perpetuity, or to nonauthors, or in unoriginal and unwritten works would not just allow
Congress to reinterpret the Constitution, but to rewrite it.
The recognition that Clause 8 limits restrain Congress any time it
attempts to grant exclusive rights in expression reveals a public domain that is resilient to forces that threaten other, more vulnerable
aspects of public domains. The penumbral public domain, defined
281
by the limits of Clause 8, is not subject to congressional whims, and
282
it is less susceptible to unpredictable judicial decision making. Nor
283
Short of a constitutional amendmust it rely on private ordering.
281

282

283

The existence of formal requirements necessary for copyright protection and the consequences of failure to comply with such formalities offer one example of the impact of legislative decision-making on the public domain. See Elizabeth Townsend Gard, January 1,
2003: The Birth of the Unpublished Public Domain and Its International Implications, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 692–93 (2006) (describing implications of failure to comply with copyright formalities). The constitutional public domain is also more resilient to
legislative extension of the copyright term. See Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 210–11, 218–20 (2002) (describing Congress’s consideration of the public domain in extending the term of copyright
protection).
The fair use defense owes its origins and developments to judicial interpretation, even
though it was statutorily recognized by the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Although fair use operates as an affirmative defense to copyright infringement, it falls within some more expansive readings of the public domain. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air
to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354, 361–62 (1999) (proposing a definition of the public domain that incorporates
fair uses).
Private licensing arrangements like those facilitated by Creative Commons licenses and
the General Public License (“GPL”) contribute to some conceptions of the public domain by permitting the public to make specified uses of copyrighted works without seek-

1144

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10:5

ment, this public domain is designed to weather the tides of shifting
legislative agendas, judicial policy, and industry practice.
But the penumbral public domain defined by the limits of Clause
8 is only part of the broader constitutional public domain. The First
Amendment imposes another set of constraints that restricts the exercise of Congress’s copyright power. Two copyright doctrines, the
fair use defense and the idea/expression distinction, function to reconcile copyright law with the First Amendment. Grants of exclusive
rights in expression that fail to respect these “traditional contours” of
284
copyright law may very well run afoul of the Constitution.
Ideas
and fair uses, then, also fall within a public domain defined by constitutional constraints.
Public domains, however, are defined not only by their content,
285
but by the freedoms they provide the public. The freedoms offered
by the penumbral public domain, although comparatively immune
from interference, are limited in a number of important respects.
Frequently, the “public domain” refers to a class of material free of
286
intellectual property rights. The works within the penumbral public domain are free of federal grants of exclusive rights, but they are
not necessarily free from intellectual property rights altogether. Unauthorized recordings of live performances, for example, can be regulated through targeted state legislation or more general state rights
of publicity. Regardless of whether these state regulations are, strictly
speaking, intellectual property rights, they impose many of the same
restrictions on the public’s freedom. Likewise, unoriginal compilations of data, even though beyond the scope of congressional authority, could be subject to state trade secrecy protection. State contract
law, of course, could further supplement these state law regimes by
enforcing private restrictions on both performances and compilations of data.
287
The “public domain” may also denote public accessibility. Even
if free of intellectual property rights, works are more valuable to the
public if they can be viewed or otherwise utilized. Works within the
penumbral public domain occupy the full spectrum of accessibility.
Some, like private performances and trade-secret data, are highly in-

284
285
286
287

ing permission from the copyright holder. See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 800–02 (explaining how GPL and Creative Commons could be alternatives to traditional intellectual
property rules).
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 816–19.
See id. at 791.
See id. at 798–99.
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accessible. Other performances, like the typical concert protected by
the anti-bootlegging statutes, are restricted by an admission fee, and
perhaps contractual terms, but otherwise open to all. Still other performances are truly public in the sense that no restrictions on access
are imposed.
The penumbral public domain, given its susceptibility to restrictions imposed by state law and the potential for inaccessibility, is by
no means the most robust public domain we can imagine or to which
we should aspire. But the works within this public domain are far
freer under a reading of the Constitution that enforces the limits of
Clause 8 than one that permits the Commerce Clause free reign over
the subject matter of Congress’s copyright power. Perhaps more importantly, the penumbral public domain, and the broader constitutional public domain of which it is a component, establishes a floor
on the contents of the public domain and the freedoms it provides.
Regardless of what the Framers believed the public domain should
include, the constitutional public domain represents what it must include. Any robust public domain we construct depends, in part, on
this foundation.

